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INTRODUCTION
In the series of cases that have made up the Supreme Court's recent
jurisprudence concerning congressional power to protect civil rights, the
Voting Rights Act (VRA) has been the standard against which all other statutes
are judged.' Unlike other civil rights statutes that may have swept too broadly
in their geographic reach and permanent duration, section 5 of the VRA
2
targeted a limited number of geographically defined wrongdoers' and did so
for a limited time.4 Unlike those constitutionally precarious statutes that may
have elevated classes from the lower tiers of Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny,'
the VRA dealt specifically with race (a classification that is "immediately
suspect"6) and with voting ("a fundamental political right, because [it is]
preservative of all rights"'). And unlike those statutes with a tenuous
relationship to unconstitutional state action,8 the VRA was built on a record of
1. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 (2001) ("The ADA's
constitutional shortcomings are apparent when the Act is compared to Congress' efforts in
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to respond to a serious pattern of constitutional violations.").
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
3. Section S applies to all or part of sixteen states: all of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas; most of Virginia; four counties in
California, five counties in Florida, two townships in Michigan, ten towns in New
Hampshire, three counties in New York, forty counties in North Carolina, and two counties
in South Dakota. Voting Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions,
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/covered.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
4. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626-27 (2000) ("By contrast [to the Violence
Against Women Act], the [VRA] § 5 remedy upheld in Katzenbach v. Morgan ... was
directed only to the State where the evil found by Congress existed, and in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach... the remedy was directed only to those States in which Congress found that
there had been discrimination.").
s. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 (striking down Title I of the Americans with Disability Act, 42
U.S.C. §5 12,111-12,117 (2000), as applied to the states); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62, 91-92 (2000) (striking down the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (2000), as applied to the states).
6. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509 (2005) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
7. YickWo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
8. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (striking down the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 13,981 (2000)); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 647-48 (1999) (striking down the Patent Remedy Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 27 1(h), 296(a)
(2000), as applied to the states); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) ("A
comparison between RFRA [Religious Freedom Restoration Act] and the Voting Rights Act
is instructive. In contrast to the record which confronted Congress and the Judiciary in the
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persistent constitutional violations by state actors who were unapologetic in
their defiance of federal court orders. 9
Because Congress acted at the apex of its power to enforce the guarantees
of the post-Civil War Amendments in passing the VRA, the Court could
stomach the tough medicine that is section 5 of the Act. That measure stands
alone in American history in its alteration of authority between the federal
government and the states and the unique procedures it requires of states and
localities that want to change their laws. No other statute applies only to a
subset of the country and requires covered states and localities to get
permission from the federal government before implementing a certain type of
law.10 Such a remedy was necessary because case-by-case adjudication of voting
rights lawsuits proved incapable of reining in crafty Dixiecrat legislatures
determined to deprive African Americans of their right to vote, regardless of
what a federal court might order."
Congress intended the expiration of section 5 to force the nation to take
stock of its progress, or lack thereof, in achieving equal voting rights, as well as
to adapt the law to new challenges and changing political realities. Those who
originally crafted the law, however, could not have foreseen how section 5
would become, in both substance and symbolism, a cornerstone of the
architecture of federal election law and civil rights guarantees. As each election
reminds us of how far we need to go in securing the equal right to vote, the
notion that we might allow this most successful of civil rights protections to die
on the vine has become so unacceptable that Congress has now reauthorized
this "emergency" provision for another twenty-five years.
Elsewhere I have described how the VRA could have been transformed to
address the problems facing minority voters that constituted the principal
voting rights cases, RFRA's legislative record lacks examples of modern instances of
generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry.").
9. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966) (acknowledging that section 5
was an uncommon exercise of congressional power justified by the "insidious and pervasive
evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and
ingenious defiance of the Constitution"); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN &
RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL
PROCESS 546-47 (2d ed. 2002).
lo. Section 5 requires jurisdictions specified by section 4 to preclear "any voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting." VRA S 5,
42 U.S.C. § 1973C (2000). A jurisdiction may seek preclearance from the Attorney General or
a declaratory judgment from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Under
either process, the jurisdiction must demonstrate that the change "does not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color." Id.
ii. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 9, at 546-47.
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justification for the law.1 2 Even for many who favored renewal, the
reauthorization process in the summer of 2006 represented a missed
opportunity to deal with some of these problems. In addition to the political
and judicial constraints placed on the reauthorization debate, the specter of
returning to an age and political environment first disciplined by section 5 of
the VRA paralyzed any attempt to use this opportunity to address the most
pressing voting rights challenges.
This Article attempts to explain the constraints on the process that led the
law to take the form that it did and to identify the best evidence in the
legislative record to ensure the law's constitutionality. More important from
the standpoint of those wishing to interpret or enforce this new law, this
Article provides an interpretation of the law's key provision that would allow it
to do more good than harm. Part I provides a summary of the unique
legislative history of the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott
King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 (the
VRARA, or the new section 5).13 As with other legislation, disagreements about
the statute's meaning were passed on to the courts, and various legislators
attempted to manipulate legislative history for partisan ends. Never before in
American history, however, has a Senate committee that unanimously voted in
favor of a law later published a postenactment committee report that was
supported only by members of one party. Part II examines the sufficiency of
the evidentiary record assembled by Congress to justify the continued
operation of section 5 in the areas that it currently covers (the "coverage
formula" or "trigger"). Section 5 applies only to certain parts of the country,
based on voting practices and data that are at least thirty years old. The novel
constitutional question posed by this law was how Congress could provide a
12. See Nathaniel Persily, Options and Strategies for Renewal of Section Five of the Voting Rights Act,
in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT 223, 228 (David L. Epstein et al. eds., 2006). My
own view is that the greatest advantages of the newly enacted law will continue to be felt at
the local level, where the partisan stakes and salience of voting law changes are low. For the
small covered county that is moving a polling place or annexing some unincorporated
territory, having the DOJ "in the room" while such decisions are made ensures that the
impact on minority voting rights will be factored into the decision. For voting changes at the
state level, particularly well-publicized redistricting plans, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
provides a comparable deterrent against discriminatory voting laws without the
accompanying risks of a politicized DOJ enforcement process. With that said, the
disenfranchisement of felons, the discriminatory application of voter ID laws, and partisan
or incompetent administration of elections present greater nationwide challenges to
minority voting rights than the voting changes ordinarily denied preclearance in the covered
jurisdictions.
13. Pub. L. No. lo9-246, 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. (120 Star.) 577 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971
to 1973aa-la).
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record of constitutional violations necessitating the continuation of a law that,
if it works as intended, prevents such evidence from emerging. Part III explains
why the law had to take the form that it did, despite widespread concerns
about the coverage formula and statutory architecture. Various proposals to
tinker with the well-known section 5 procedures -namely, where it should
apply, how jurisdictions might escape its constraints, and how the law would
be administered- faced an uphill battle and were soundly defeated. Part W
forms the bulk of this Article and offers an interpretation of the key provision
of the new section 5: the new retrogression standard that prevents covered
jurisdictions from enacting or administering voting laws that "diminish"
minority voters' "ability... to elect their preferred candidates of choice.' 14 The
proposed interpretation, which focuses on the extent of racial polarization in
the electorate, represents an attempt to save the law from likely constitutional
challenges and from enforcement patterns that would contradict the
underlying purposes of the law.
The Conclusion presents an argument presaged here. The descriptive and
normative sections of this paper are united by a common appreciation for the
unprecedented political context in which this reauthorization occurred. In a
sense, as compared to the legislative efforts of twenty-five and forty-two years
ago, everything should have been different for this reauthorization. The
constitutional test the courts would now apply never before cast a shadow on
legislative bargaining. The partisan stakes, never before accorded much
significance, were now well known. The most salient threats to minority voting
rights had evolved beyond the categories and geography contemplated by the
VRA. Nevertheless, the fear and uncertainty of what the world would be like
without it allowed transformation only in the direction of restoring the Act to
its original meaning. The consequences of this altered political reality do not
end with the passage of the law, however. Despite historically familiar
purposes and language, the VRA begins to mean something different when
grafted onto a political system that it helped shape.
I. THE PATH OF LEGISLATION
When considered in the abstract, and against the history of American
election reform and civil rights legislation, the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA
by a near unanimous vote represents a remarkable, even if predictable,
14. 42 U.S.C.A. § 197 3 c(b) (West Supp. 2007).
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achievement." The vote was remarkable in that almost all participants in the
policy debate recognize that section 5 of the VRA represents a unique exception
to the normal functioning of federalism and partisan politics; many
Republicans consider it offensive to their notions of color-blindness and states'
rights, and some Democrats see it as counter to their political interests. 6 The
vote was predictable, however, in that virtually no one wanted to be on record
opposing the legislation.' 7 Republicans who may have disagreed with the
legislation in principle nevertheless viewed it as largely serving their political
interests. Most of them considered redistricting pursuant to aggressive
enforcement of section 5 as creating inefficient Democratic districts. Moreover,
the legislation appeared to be a relatively costless step toward thawing
relationships with African Americans and maintaining gains among Hispanic
supporters. On the other hand, most Democrats supported the reauthorization
in principle, and those who did not considered opposition (or even
amendment) to constitute political suicide.
A. The VRARA in the House: Channeling Dissent into Failed Amendments
Despite the widespread consensus in favor of reauthorization, many
potential obstacles could have derailed the steady progress toward renewal.'
8
One cannot overstate the importance of the unlikely leadership of James
15. The law passed the House by a vote of 390 to 33, 152 CONG. REc. H 5207 (daily ed. July 13,
20o6), but passed the Senate unanimously, 98 to o, 152 CONG. REC. S8o12 (daily ed. July 20,
2006). The original Voting Rights Act of 1965 passed the House by a vote of 328 to 74 and
the Senate by a vote of 79 to 18. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer & Guy-Uriel E. Charles,
Preclearance, Discrimination, and the Department ofJustice: The Case of South Carolina, 57 S.C.
L. REv. 827, 833 (2006); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966).
16. See Joseph Williams, Voting Act Overshadows Race Debate: Democrats Weigh Diluting Districts
of Black Majorities, BOSTON GLOBE, July 31, 2006, at A2 (quoting Representative Rahm
Emanuel arguing for the unpacking of heavily minority districts in order to help more
Democrats win).
17. See Julie Fernandes, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Remarks at the Conference on
Elections and Democracy at Stanford Law School (Apr. 7, 2007), available at http://voir
dire.stanford.edu/program/centers/conlaw/2o07O4O7_ConLaw-ElectionsDemocracy-anel
2-15ok.mov (describing the strategy of the civil rights community to make passage of the bill
seem "inevitable" and make voting against it seem dramatic).
18. For a comprehensive discussion of the reauthorization process in the House of
Representatives, see James Thomas Tucker, The Politics of Persuasion: Passage of the Voting
Rights Act Reauthorization Act of 2oo6, 33 J. LEGIS. 205 (2007). Tucker's exposition of events
in the House is so comprehensive that I provide only an abbreviated recounting here and
focus mainly on the Senate. By doing so I do not mean to understate the importance of what
happened in the House.
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Sensenbrenner, Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, in
pushing through the legislation. 9 He wanted the reauthorization of the Voting
Rights Act to occur on his watch, and, consistent with his leadership style on
other issues, nothing was going to stand in his way. Pursuant to the rules of
the Republican Conference, however, his term as Chairman was to expire at
the end of 2006, a year before section 5 of the VRA was scheduled to sunset.2"
Therefore, the timetable for the legislation was moved up a year, with House
hearings held between October 2005 and May 2006.
On the House side, as is often true with legislation expected to pass by a
wide margin, the hearings featured relatively few witnesses testifying against
19. See id. at 214-15. If one wants to get a sense of the influence of Sensenbrenner on the process,
one need only look at the comments of one of his Republican colleagues, Representative
Lynn Westmoreland, who eventually voted against reauthorization and has promised to sue
to have the courts strike it down. A press release from Westmoreland's office the day the bill
passed explained:
We came up short today of the votes we needed to modernize and strengthen the
Voting Rights Act, largely because of partisan posturing, ignorance of the act's
details and lingering prejudice toward Southerners. We lost on the vote board in
the House, but we won in the grand scheme of things....
*.. We created a public record that will be cited when there's an inevitable
court challenge to Section 5. We needed 218 votes in the House but we'll only
need five votes on the Supreme Court. Justice will prevail. The honor of Georgia
will be restored....
... If this bill is tossed by the courts and the Voting Rights Act is
undermined, the fault should be laid at the feet of Judiciary Committee Chairman
James Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin. His legacy will be his unyielding support for
a law that endangered the future of the Voting Rights Act.
Press Release, Representative Lynn Westmoreland, Statement on House Passage of Voting
Rights Act (July 13, 2006), available at http://westmoreland.house.gov/news/Document
single.aspx?DocumentID=47o24.
2o. Had the Republicans retained control of the House, Sensenbrenner would likely have been
replaced as chairman by Representative Lamar Smith, a conservative Texan with a record of
opposing parts of the VRA. See Tucker, supra note 18, at 216. The expedited process and
early success of reauthorization led to an unintended consequence in the law. Like its
predecessor, the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 to 1973aa-6 (2000)), the 2006 legislation sunsets
after twenty-five years. See VRARA, Pub L. No. 1O9-246, § 4, 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. (120
Stat.) 577, 58o (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)); Tucker, supra note 18, at 221. Because
no one thought the reauthorization would happen before it was necessary (that is, before
2007), the twenty-five-year time horizon had the virtue of capturing three redistricting
cycles (2012, 2022, 2032). However, because Congress passed the legislation one year early,
the legislation now is set to expire in the middle of the 2031 redistricting process.
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reauthorization." Most of the effort of the House Committee was directed at
assembling a record demonstrating the persistence of discrimination in voting
in the covered jurisdictions and the constitutionality of the proposed bill.
Nevertheless, once the measure moved toward the floor, two sets of
Republicans became more vocal concerning their objections to the bill. One
group, mainly from the Southern jurisdictions covered by section 5, renewed
familiar arguments from the VRA's inception that their states were unfairly
targeted and urged reforms to the coverage formula and bailout procedures."
Members of another faction objected to the language assistance provisions of
section 203 of the VRA,23 echoing similar arguments expressed during the
concurrent debate over immigration reform.' Although the original rule for
the vote on the VRA would have precluded any amendments, those with
objections invoked the norm, if not the rule, of the Republican Conference that
a "majority of the majority" had to support a bill before it could be moved to
z. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 2oo6 (pt. 2): Hearing on H.R. 9 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo9th Cong. 14-17 (2oo6) (statement of Chris Norby,
Supervisor, Orange County Board of Supervisors) (opposing language assistance provisions
of section 203 of the Act); Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights
Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 (pt. 1): Hearing on H.. 9 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, logth Cong. 13-37 (2006)
(statement of Roger Clegg, President & General Counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity)
(finding the bill to be "bad policy from beginning to end"); Voting Rights Act: Section 5-
Preclearance Standards: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 1o9th Cong. 29-43 (2005) (statement of Roger Clegg, Vice President and General
Counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity) (arguing, prior to the proposal of the bill, that
certain proposed changes to section 5 might be unconstitutional); Voting Rights Act: The
Continuing Need for Section 5: Hearing on H.R. 9 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1o9th Cong. 29-48 (2005) (statement of Ronald Keith Gaddie,
Professor of Political Science, University of Oklahoma) (noting progress in covered
jurisdictions and lack of differences with uncovered jurisdictions); Voting Rights Act: Section
5 of the Act - History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo9th Cong. 14-17 (2005) (statement of Edward Blum, Visiting
Fellow, American Enterprise Institute) (opposing reauthorization bill as excessively race-
based and outdated).
22. See infra note 30 (describing how Representatives Norwood and Westmoreland introduced
amendments to replace section 5's coverage formula and bailout provisions).
23. Pub. L. No. 1O9-246, 5 7, 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. (120 Stat.) 577, 581 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§1973aa-la(b)(l)).
24. See Tucker, supra note 18, at 238-40; infra note 29 and accompanying text (explaining that
Representative King introduced an amendment to repeal section 203's multilingual
assistance provisions in their entirety).
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the floor.2' To mollify the holdouts, four amendments were allowed on the
floor. These ranged from proposals to alter the coverage formula 6 or bailout
procedures 7 to others attempting to accelerate the sunsetting of the law 8 or to
change the language assistance provisions.2 9 All were soundly defeated, but
three garnered a majority of the Republican members.3" The House passed the
bill by a vote of 39o to 33 on July 13, 2006.31
B. The VRARA in the Senate: Channeling Dissent into Postenactment
Legislative History
The story in the Senate was quite different. The nine Senate Judiciary
Committee hearings held between April 27, 2006, and July 13, 2006, featured
heated debates concerning the constitutionality and desirability of the
legislation. 32 Individual Judiciary Committee members had serious reservations
25. See Carl Hulse, Rebellion Stalls Extension of Voting Act, N.Y. TIM.Es, June 22, 2006, at A23
(explaining that the House leadership's informal rule that "no bill can reach a vote without
the support of the majority of the Republicans" was met with criticism for not fostering
bipartisan support); Southerners Complain, Voting Rights Act Pulled from Floor, NAT'L J.'S
CONGRESs DAILY, June 21, 2006 (explaining that the House Republican leaders no longer
applied the "majority of the majority rule" to the Voting Rights Act, angering Southern
Republicans); see also Tucker, supra note 18, at 245 (explaining the rule of a "majority of the
majority").
a6. Representative Norwood's amendment, H.R. REP. No. 109-554, pt. 1, at 2 (20o6), would
have updated the coverage formula to apply based on voter turnout in the last three
presidential elections. That amendment was defeated by a vote of 318 to 96. 152 CONG. REC.
H52o4 (daily ed. July 13, 2006).
27. Representative Westmoreland's amendment, H.R. REP. No. 109-554, pt. 4, at 2 (20o6), the
so-called proactive bail out measure, would have made it easier for covered jurisdictions to
bailout from coverage. It was defeated by a vote of 302 to 118. 152 CONG. REc. H52o6-o7
(daily ed. July 13, 2006).
28. Representative Gohmert's amendment, H.R. REP. No. 109-554, Pt. 2, at 2 (2oo6), would
have shortened the sunset period of the bill to ten years. It failed by a vote of 288 to 134. 152
CONG. REC. H 5 2o 5 (daily ed. July 13, 2006).
2g. Representative King's amendment, H.R. REP. No. 109-554, Pt. 3, at 2 (20o6), would have
deleted section 203's multilingual assistance provisions. it failed by a vote of 238 to 185. 152
CONG. REc. H52o5-o6 (daily ed. July 13, 2006).
30. See supra notes 26-29; see also Tucker, supra note 18, at 236-39 (describing other
amendments considered and defeated in committee).
31. 152 CONG. REc. H52o7 (daily ed. July 13, 2006).
32. The debate in the Senate hearings revealed a bit of a rift between legal academics and voting
rights advocates. See generally Rick Hasen, Why Bother Trying To Fix Section 5, Election Law
Blog, May 13, 2006, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/oo56o7.html (describing the
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about the proposed bill. Those concerns revolved around the maintenance of
the current coverage formula and bailout procedures, the twenty-five-year
extension period, the new retrogression test, and what some Republican
Senators considered the rushed process of deliberation that rejected any
substantive amendments to the bill.33 At various points it appeared that the
legislation might be held over to the next Congress, especially once the
language assistance provisions of section 203 became framed by the parallel
debate over immigration reform. 4
testimony of law professors). Loyola Law School Professor Richard Hasen alerted the
committee to the potential constitutional difficulties with the bill and provided suggestions
on how to save it. An Introduction to the Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and Legal
Issues Relating to Reauthorization: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, logth Cong.
214-19 (2006) [hereinafter Introductory Senate Hearings] (statement of Richard Hasen). NYU
Law School Professor Samuel Issacharoff suggested a dramatically different enforcement
regime for section 5. Id. at 220-25 (statement of Samuel Issacharoff). NYU Law School
Professor Richard Pildes raised concerns about the new retrogression standard that
overruled Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003), the constitutional deficiencies in the
record supporting reauthorization, and the inability of the section 5 architecture to deal with
contemporary voting rights problems. The Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo9th Cong. 198-207 (2006) [hereinafter Need
for Section 5 Pre-Clearance Senate Hearing] (statement of Richard Pildes). Stanford Law
School Professor Pamela Karlan defended the constitutionality of the bill. Id. at 174-95
(statement of Pamela S. Karlan). I focused my remarks, see infra Part IV, on what the
retrogression standard should mean in practice. Understanding the Benefits and Costs of Pre-
Clearance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo9th Cong. 11-13, 105-37 (2006)
(statement of Nathaniel Persily). Professor Drew Days of Yale Law School detailed his
experiences as Solicitor General and Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, suggesting
that the VRA was still necessary and constitutional, and reinforced the findings of the
National Commission on the VRA. Id. at 5-7, 31-70 (statement of Drew Days). Professor
Sherrilyn Ifill of the University of Maryland attempted to explain why the Supreme Court's
decision in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2oo6),
reinforced the need for a strong VRA. Renewing the Temporary Provisions of the Voting Rights
Act: Legislative Options After LULAC v. Perry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, logth Cong. 6-
8, 50-60 (2006) [hereinafter Section 5 Renewal Senate Hearing] (statement of Sherrilyn Ifill).
Seattle University Law School's Joaquin Avila attested to the persistence of racially polarized
voting in California. Id. at 11-13, 27-44 (statement of Joaquin G. Avila).
33. See S. REP. No. 109-295, at 25-36 (2006) (presenting Senators Cornyn and Coburn's
objections to the "expedited process" that reauthorized an outdated coverage formula and
"failed to produce thorough deliberation" that would have generated a superior product).
The concerns of the senators were also quite evident in the tone of the questions they
submitted to witnesses. See Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance Senate Hearing, supra note 32, at
98-104 (statement of Pamela S. Karlan, Professor of Law, Stanford University) (responding
to questions submitted by Senators Cornyn and Coburn).
34. See Continuing Need for Section 203's Provisions for Limited English Proficient Voters: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, logth Cong. 288 (2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("I
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Any potential roadblocks to passage were removed once President Bush
became involved, however. He scheduled his first presidential speech to the
NAACP for July 20, 2006, and used the opportunity to stress his support for
reauthorization "without amendment."3 Majority Leader Bill Frist placed the
House bill on the Senate calendar for the same day as the President's speech
with rules that prevented any amendments on the floor. On the day before the
Senate vote on the House bill, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported its own
bill, which was identical to the House version, save for the addition of Ctsar
Chivez's name to the title. 6 This raised an interesting procedural question: if
the Senate passed a bill that had a different title but exactly the same substance
as the one passed by the House, would a conference committee nevertheless
need to be assembled? To avoid that possibility, to prevent any Senate dilly-
dallying on its bill, and to ensure the Senate vote would take place on the day
of the President's speech to the NAACP, Majority Leader Frist simply moved
the House bill to the Senate floor. 37 The Senate unanimously approved (98-0)
the House bill shortly after the President's speech.
38
was troubled during the immigration debate that the rhetoric of some Members of the
Senate appeared to be anti-Hispanic in supporting the adoption of an English language
amendment."); Letter from Charles Norwood et al., Members of the House of
Representatives, to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker, House of Representatives, and John
Boehner, Majority Leader, House of Representatives (June 9, 20o6), available at
http ://electionlawblog.org/archives/vra-house-letter.pdf (explaining that forty-four
Republican House members do not support section 203 which imposes a "serious burden on
the states" at the cost of causing "cracks in our party's cohesiveness"); see also Tucker, supra
note 18, at 239-43.
35. See President George W. Bush, Keynote Address at the NAACP Annual Convention (July
20, 20o6), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2oo6/o7/2oo6o72o.html
("I thank the members of the House of Representatives for re-authorizing the Voting Rights
Act. Soon the Senate will take up the legislation. I look forward to the Senate passing this
bill promptly without amendment- (applause)- so I can sign it into law. (Applause.)"). A
week before the speech, the White House released a statement of policy that forecast the
administration's position. See Tucker, supra note 18, at 251 nn.475-76.
36. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, Coretta Scott King, and C~sar E. Chivez Voting Rights
Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 20o6, S. 2703, io9th Cong. S 1 (as reported by
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, July 19, 20o6); S. REP. No. 109-295, at 34 (20o6) ("[T]he
Committee approved by voice vote an amendment offered by Senator Leahy to incorporate
Mr. Cesar Chavez's name into the title of the Act. ). In the subsequent Congress, a bill
has been proposed to rename the Act to the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, Coretta Scott
King, Ctsar E. Chivez, Barbara C. Jordan, and William C. Velasquez Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006. See A Bill To Revise the Short Title of the
Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of2o6, S. 188, 1ioth Cong. (as submitted Jan. 4, 2007).
37- Perhaps it should go without saying, but the Republicans also had a legitimate fear that
Democrats would use the VRA in the 2006 elections to motivate their base. If the legislation
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Six days after the Senate passed the House bill and one day before the
President signed the bill into law on July 27, the Judiciary Committee "Report"
on its version of the bill was filed.39 Not only was a presidential "stick"
instrumental in propelling the House bill to passage in the Senate, but the
unprecedented character of the after-the-fact committee report strongly
suggests that the opportunity to alter the Senate Report provided a carrot that
appeased some of the Senate Republicans who had reservations. In fact, despite
a unanimous vote on the Senate bill both in the committee and on the floor,
only half of the eighteen members of the Judiciary Committee- all of whom
were Republicans -signed on to the Report. 4' The final draft of the Report
itself was not circulated to Democratic senators on the Committee until the day
the President signed the bill into law. 4' In their "additional views" included
with the Report, the Democrats on the Committee emphasized, "We object
and do not subscribe to this Committee Report ... which ... has become a
very different document than the draft Report circulated by the Chairman on
July 24, 20o6. "42
had been held over until 2007 when the old section 5 was to expire, the Democrats might
have used the failure to reauthorize ahead of schedule as a club to target certain House and
Senate incumbents in their reelection campaigns. Indeed, when it looked like the process
might come off the rails due to objections from those concerned with the language
assistance provisions of section 203, as well as those in favor of the various House
amendments, the civil rights community launched an intense public relations effort to urge
Congress to pass the measure. See, e.g., Barbara Arnwine, Op-Ed., Voting Rights Act Renewal
up to Specter, PHILA. TRtm., June 27, 2006, at 7-A (complaining of efforts to stall the Act at
the last minute).
38. 152 CONG. REC. S8012 (daily ed. July 20, 2006).
39- S. REP. No. 109-295, at 1 (2006). I place the word "Report" in quotes and use the passive
voice in the text because the precise nature of the document that was filed by nine members
of the Committee is open to dispute given the procedural irregularities described below.
40. All of the Republicans on the Judiciary Committee except Senator Mike DeWine signed the
Report, and all eight of the Democrats refused to do so, attaching "additional views" to the
Report registering their objections. See 152 CONG. REC. S8373 (daily ed. July 27, 2006)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (listing the names of the nine Republicans who appeared on the
signature page of the Report). As a result, only half of the committee's membership (nine of
eighteen senators) signed onto the Report, and eight expressly dissented from the Report.
41. See id. ("I understand that the chairman filed a committee report last night on S. 2703, the
Senate bill reported by the committee last Wednesday. I have yet to see a copy of that final
report, nor is it yet publicly available."); Rick Hasen, Senate VRA Report Now Available,
Election Law Blog, Aug. 1, 2006, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/oo6382.html.
42. S. REP. No. 109-295, at 54 (2006); see also Seth Stern, Senate Democrats Suggest Republicans
Tried To Undercut Voting Rights Act, CONG. Q. TODAY, July 27, 2006. In fact, the Democrats'
additional views were based on a prior draft of the Report, as is clear from their inaccurate
statement that the Report "include[s] Additional Views signed by the Chairman." S. REP.
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The evolution of the Senate Judiciary Committee Report offers the best
window into the fragility of the political compromise that undergirds the new
VRA and the basic disagreement that exists concerning its key provision. It also
provides a unique case study in the self-conscious manipulation of legislative
history for partisan ends and the shadow cast on the legislative bargaining
process by the Supreme Court's recent federalism precedents. Moreover, given
the importance the Court has attributed to legislative history in previous
reauthorizations -namely, the centrality of the "Senate Factors" to the Court's
subsequent interpretation of the 1982 Amendments to the VRA'- the unique
character and procedural background of the Committee Report should cause
concern regarding how courts or the Department of Justice (DOJ) might apply
the law in concrete cases.
The hope of supporters of reauthorization was that the Senate Report
would take the form of the House Report. Akin to a lawyer's brief, it would
present the legislative record as unambiguously supporting reauthorization,
and as providing substantial evidence to support its constitutionality. To do so,
the Report would need to credit the damning examples of voting rights
violations in covered jurisdictions and interpret the previous twenty-five years
of experience under section 5 as demonstrating the VRA's continued utility.
The proposed "Statement of Joint Views of Senate Judiciary Committee
Members," which the Committee Democrats originally crafted but never
released, did exactly that.44 It is unsurprising that the Republican members of
No. 109-295, at 54 (2006). Chairman Specter did not sign onto the additional views of any
of his Republican colleagues.
43. See Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1017 (1994); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-
51 (1986); ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 9, at 769.
44. The Democrats' initial statement (totaling 145 pages) was quickly assembled the weekend
before the Senate vote and circulated to Judiciary Committee Republicans at 8:35 p.m. the
day before the vote. The next draft, circulated to the Republican members at 8:33 a.m. on
the day of the vote, was ioo pages and comments were requested by 9:30 a.m. Minority
Staff of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo9th Cong., Statement of Joint Views of Senate
Judiciary Committee Members (July 20, 2006) (unpublished draft report, on file with
author) (hereinafter Statement of Joint Views]. The tight timetable led to a volley of heated
letters between Ranking Member Patrick Leahy and Chairman Arlen Specter. On July 25,
Senator Leahy suggested that the rush to release the Report would prevent Democratic
senators from offering their own additional views and was in violation of Senate rules.
Letter from Patrick Leahy, Ranking Democratic Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
to Arlen Specter, Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary (July 25, 20o6), available at
http://electionlawblog.org/archivesAeahy.pdf. Describing Leahy as "misinformed on several
points," Senator Specter responded with a letter the following day, when the Report was
released. Letter from Arlen Specter, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, to Patrick J.
Leahy, Ranking Democratic Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (July 26, 2006),
available at http://electionlawblog.org/archives/specter-response.pdf. According to Senator
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the Committee could not sign onto this "Statement of Joint Views." As is clear
from the final product, the Republicans did not want to condemn the covered
jurisdictions with as broad and resounding a declaration as did the House
Committee. They also disagreed fundamentally with the Democrats'
interpretation of the retrogression standard 4s and wanted to provide what they
considered to be a more balanced view of the record, which would place greater
emphasis on voting rights progress. The final Report bears no resemblance to
the initial "Statement of Joint Views."
In their additional views in the final Report, the Democrats summarized
their objections as follows: "we must register our disappointment that this
Report does not reflect our views or those of scores of other cosponsors, does
not properly describe the record supporting our bill, and does not fully endorse
the bill we introduced and sponsored .... "46 The Democrats objected both to
the body of the Report and to the additional views from Senators John Kyl,
Tom Coburn, and John Cornyn.47 The body of the Report (as well as the
additional views of Senator Kyl) proffered a specific view of the new
retrogression standard that protected only "naturally occurring majority-
minority districts."48 Many Democrats consider this interpretation of the
central provision of the bill to be counter to their political interests, 49 if not
subversive of the goal of protecting all kinds of districts (so-called influence or
coalition districts) in which minorities usually constitute less than half of the
district's voting population, but can nevertheless influence the outcome of an
election."0 There was a risk, expressed by some who testified at the hearings,
that protecting the ability of minorities to elect their "preferred candidate of
choice" would mean protecting their ability to elect Democrats, given that
Specter's letter, on July 21 his staff "made it clear that [he] could not join" the Statement of
Views. Id. at 2. He also maintained that on July 23 Senator Leahy made clear that he could
support a draft of the Report with edits provided by his staff, although he "preferred that no
report be filed on behalf of the Committee." Id. Senator Spector further stated that this
version of the Report, along with additional views provided by any Member, was the
version he intended to file. Id.; see also Rick Hasen, Some Insight into the Drafting of the Senate
VRA Committee Report, Election Law Blog, Aug. 2, 2006,
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/oo6393.html.
45. See S. REP. No. 109-295, at 14-15 (2006).
46. Id. at 54.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 24.
49. See Williams, supra note 16 (describing Rep. Rahm Emanuel's concerns about heavily
packed minority districts).
5o. See infra Section IV.B.
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minorities tend to favor Democrats."' As described in greater detail below, the
new retrogression standard can be seen as entrenching either Republican or
Democratic gerrymanders depending on which types of districts it protects and
which types of interdistrict population tradeoffs it prevents. The Republicans
maintain that the law prevents minority population reductions in majority-
minority districts and only in those districts. The Democrats would allow the
unpacking of some such districts but would also protect certain minority-
minority districts that elect minority-preferred candidates. 2
In addition to their dispute over the meaning of the new section 5, the
Democrats worried that the Report undermined the case supporting the
constitutionality of the law. The inclusion of the additional views of Senators
Comyn and Coburn, in particular, had the potential to characterize the
legislative record in a way that would lead the Supreme Court to strike down
the law as exceeding Congress's power under the Enforcement Clauses of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 3 Those Senators expressed what
several witnesses at the hearings found problematic with the Act: the lack of
findings of relevant differences between the covered and noncovered
jurisdictions, the alleged inflexibility of the bailout procedures, and the
overreaching policy and constitutional precariousness of a twenty-five-year
sunset period. 4 These concerns were heightened by what those. Senators
considered defects in the legislative process leading to reauthorization. Despite
the fact that their party could have controlled the pace of the legislation
(admittedly receiving criticism for being against civil rights had they slowed it
down), they complained that "[a]n artificial rush to move the House version"
occurred a full year before the relevant sections of the VRA were to expire."s
"[T]his important legislation was-unfortunately-a bit of a foregone
51. See Section 5 Renewal Senate Hearing, supra note 32, at lo-ii (statement of Michael A. Carvin,
Partner, Jones Day).
52. For more on this point, see infra Part IV.
53- See S. REP. No. 109-295, at 25-36 (2006); Stern, supra note 42 ("'It's outrageous that several
members of that committee who signed this report who purport to support the [Voting
Rights Act] show up at the signing ceremony at the same time they file this report which
seeks to lay out a road map to challenge the constitutionality of the law,' said Caroline
Fredrickson, director of the ACLU's Washington office."). In fairness to the Republicans,
they would not characterize the Report as sowing the seeds of unconstitutionality. Rather,
they would likely argue that a biased report that ignored voting rights progress would be
written off by the Court as disconnected from reality.
54. S. REP. No. 109-295, at 25-26 (2006); see also infra Part III.
55- S. REp. No. 109-295, at 31 (2006).
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conclusion," they argued, and "[fjrom the outset the default seemed to be to
accept the House product without deliberation.",
6
In contrast, the House Report had included an entire section arguing in
favor of the constitutionality of the bill and rejected any specific clarifying
definition of the new retrogression standard 7 The House Report emphasized
the long line of precedent upholding the VRA against constitutional challenge
and compared the newly reauthorized VRA to the laws (such as the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) s8 or equal access provisions of the Americans with
Disability Act s") upheld after City of Boerne v. Flores.6" Those laws were
constitutional because they protected suspect classes or fundamental rights; the
Voting Rights Act has the advantage of doing both. The House Report also
evaded the tough questions concerning the retrogression standard by merely
clarifying (and reiterating ad nauseum) that it overruled Georgia v. Ashcroft,6
reinstated the standard from Beer v. United States,6 2 and focused the
retrogression inquiry on the "ability to elect" rather than on any amorphous
standard of influence. It did not give guidance as to how the ability-to-elect
determination should be made.6"
56. Id. at 31, 34; see also Fernandes, supra note 17. It is worth noting, however, that Senate
Majority Leader Bill Frist originally proposed renewal of section 5 as an amendment to a gun
bill in 2004. Supporters of reauthorization were justifiably concerned that slipping the VRA
through in such a manner without a considerable record being developed would lead the
Court to strike it down. See Tucker, supra note 18, at 211-12 & n.6o.
57. H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 55 (2006).
58. 29 U.S.C. §5 2612-2654 (2000). The Court upheld the FMLA against constitutional
challenge in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
59. 42 U.S.C. 5§ 12,101-12,213 (2000). Those were upheld in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509
(2004).
60. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
61. 539 U.S. 461 (2003). In a curious turn of phrase, the House Report says the bill emphasizes
that "Congress partly rejects the Supreme Court's decision in Georgia v. Ashcrofi." H.R. REP.
No. 109-478, at 94 (2006). It is not clear from either the bill or the legislative materials
which part of Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003), the law rejects and which part it
retains. Presumably, it retains the part that says merely reducing the number of ability-to-
elect districts could constitute retrogression, while it rejects the notion that a jurisdiction
could make up for such reductions with a comparable increase in the number of influence
districts.
62. 425 U.S. 130, 138 (1976) (interpreting section s to apply only to "proposed changes in voting
procedures").
63. See H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 68-72 (2006). The apparent shift in the parties' positions
from the publication of the House Report to the Senate Report could be due to several
factors. First, the House Democrats were so pleased with the swift movement of the bill that
they did not want to rock the boat by dealing with the hard questions as to what the ability-
117:174 200 7
THE PROMISE AND PITFALLS OF THE NEW VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Fundamental disagreements existed among the senators over the
desirability, constitutionality, and the meaning of the law. Thus, even an
attempt to pass a watered-down consensus report and to leave heated
disagreements for expressions of "additional views" was not possible. As is
clear from the final Report, some Republican senators found the geographic
reach of the law to be unfair and potentially unconstitutional, as well as
unjustified given what they regarded as voting rights progress. On the
fundamental question of what the major new requirement in the law (the
retrogression standard) meant, the Republicans believed it only protected
"naturally occurring majority-minority districts, '6 4 while the Democrats
considered it to protect a greater variety of districts with varying percentages of
racial minorities.6s The parties could not even agree as to what evidence of
to-elect standard would mean in practice. Second, the meaning of the ability-to-elect
standard was a more substantial point of debate in the Senate hearings than in the House
hearings. See supra note 32. The potential partisan effects of two completely different but
legitimate interpretations of the standard were first emphasized in the Senate hearings.
Third, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (20o6), just as the Senate Committee was wrapping up its hearings.
That decision, which struck down one Republican district held by a Hispanic incumbent as
violating section 2 of the VRA and upheld another district against a challenge based on an
argument that the white Democrat in the district was the African American candidate of
choice, brought to the fore the way that ability-to-elect might be interpreted to help
Democrats. Following the decision, at the insistence of Senator Cornyn, the Committee held
an additional hearing to evaluate the decision's impact on VRA reauthorization, where some
witnesses warned of how the standard could be interpreted to protect Democratic districts.
Section 5 Renewal Senate Hearing, supra note 32. Finally, the Democrats' proposed Joint
Statement made clear their differences with the Republicans and provoked a debate that had
been kept below the surface during the drafting of the House Report.
64. S. REP. No. 109-295, at 18-21 (2006).
65. In contrast to the final Report, which viewed the law as preventing the reduction in the
number of "naturally occurring majority minority districts," the "Statement of Joint Views"
interpreted the retrogression standard along the following lines:
Nothing in this language suggests that covered jurisdictions cannot reduce the
percentage of minority voters in a given district, with the goal of creating a new
"coalition district" or increasing the influence of minority voters in other districts,
so long as minority voters in the original district- though a smaller percentage of
the district- still retain their ability to elect a preferred candidate.
The "ability to elect" standard does not lock in districts that meet any
particular threshold. Determinations about whether a district provides the
minority community the ability to elect must be made on a case-by-case basis.
Indeed, prior to Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Department of Justice utilized case-by-
case analysis to determine whether a voting change impacted the minority
community's "ability to elect." ... This analysis allows jurisdictions a degree of
flexibility in the adoption of their voting changes.
Statement of Joint Views, supra note 44, at 84.
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voting rights violations should be included in the body of the Report, as
opposed to the Appendix.
These substantive disagreements and procedural irregularities may lead
reviewing courts to disregard the Senate Report entirely, and rely on the House
Committee Report and record, the findings in the law itself, and the materials
that the senators had before them at the time of their vote.66 Indeed, the
gamesmanship surrounding the Committee Report will provide additional
ammunition for those, such as Justice Scalia, who never want to consider such
legislative materials as a guide to statutory meaning.67 However, as discussed
later in this Article, on certain key questions of what the law means, the Senate
Report provides the principal legislative history as to how the law should work
in practice. Therefore, while judges may discount it in their opinions, they
inevitably will need to confront it.
II. THE EVIDENTIARY RECORD
The differing views of policymakers and advocates as to what the law
actually meant remained pushed to the background of the legislative debate
because Congress spent most of its time and effort assembling a record
sufficient to justify the constitutionality of the law. The constitutional standard
for congressional authority to enforce civil rights had changed since the last
reauthorization. Supporters of the Act were justifiably concerned that the new
VRA (whatever it provided) was more vulnerable than its predecessors.
It is worth mentioning at the outset, however, the unique constitutional
quandary presented to supporters of the Act concerning the record they needed
to develop.68 The new constitutional standard for congressional authority to
66. See Tucker, supra note 18, at 266 n.653 (assembling cases ruling that postenactment
legislative history is irrelevant to statutory interpretation).
67. See ANTONIN ScALiA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 34
(1997); see also Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 5O U.S. 597, 616-23 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (viewing committee reports as unreliable indicators of legislative intent);
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Committee
reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies between Congressmen ... are frail substitutes
for bicameral vote upon the text of a law and its presentment to the President."). Justice
Scalia's views on the meaninglessness of committee reports for purposes of statutory
interpretation predate his appointment to the Supreme Court. See Hirschey v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring).
68. See Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance Senate Hearing, supra note 32, at 174-97 (statement of
Pamela S. Karlan) (highlighting potential constitutional problems with the reauthorized
VRA); Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power To Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the
Voting Rights Act Afer Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 2o6-07 (2005) (same).
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enforce civil rights that emerged from City of Boerne v. Flores6" and its
progeny" established that such laws must be "congruent and proportional" to
remedying or preventing violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The new
VRA was quite different from other laws either upheld" or struck down72 post-
Boerne: (1) the bill proposed renewal of existing legislation, not drafting a law
from scratch; and (2) the law would not apply nationwide.73
First, because Congress was not writing legislation anew, but rather
reauthorizing a law currently in effect, it was unclear what record of
discrimination it needed to develop.74 To prove the law was necessary, the best
evidence would be data concerning the extent of voting rights violations in the
covered jurisdictions, especially if such violations were more prevalent in
covered than in noncovered jurisdictions. However, if the Act was working
well, then few such examples should exist. Conversely, if widespread voting
rights violations continued in the covered jurisdictions, then the law arguably
69. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
70. See cases cited supra notes 1, 4-5, 8; cases cited infra notes 71-72.
71. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (upholding public accommodations provisions
of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12,131-12,165 (2000), insofar
as they provide access to state courthouses); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721 (2003) (upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2654 (2000),
against constitutional challenge). The Court had upheld the VRA as amended in 1982
against a federalism challenge two years after Boerne. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525
U.S. 266 (1999). However, that case was principally about the constitutionality of the Act
insofar as it required covered localities in uncovered states to seek preclearance for state
voting laws.
72. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2OOl) (striking down Title I of
the Americans with Disability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111-12,117 (2000), as applied to the
states); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the Violence Against
Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13,981 (2000)); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)
(striking down the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000), as
applied to the states); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627 (1999) (striking down the Patent Remedy Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 27 1(h), 296(a) (2000),
as applied to the states); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (striking down the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 20oobb to 20oobb-4 (2000), as applied to the states).
73. See Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power To Extend and Amend the Voting
Rights Act, 44 Hous. L. R~v. 1 (2007); Ellen D. Katz, Congressional Power To Extend
Preclearance: A Response to Professor Karlan, 44 Hous. L. REV. 33 (2007). See generally Need for
Section 5 Pre-Clearance Senate Hearing, supra note 32, at 5-6 (statement of Pamela S. Karlan)
(explaining why the VRARA poses new questions but is nevertheless constitutional under
Boerne).
74. See Karlan, supra note 73, at 20-27; Mark A. Posner, Time Is Still on Its Side: Why
Congressional Reauthorization of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Represents a Congruent and
Proportional Response to Our Nation's History of Discrimination in Voting, lo N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL'Y 51, 123-131 (2006) (arguing that the VRARA is constitutional).
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was not working, and it would be difficult to justify it as a congruent and
proportional remedy.75 Like those who advocate for continuing a heightened
police presence in a previously, but not presently, high-crime neighborhood,
advocates for renewal needed to marshal evidence both of the law's success and
the harmful consequences of its removal. 6
Second, "congruence and proportionality" may mean something different
for a law that does not apply to the nation as a whole. Unlike a law of general
applicability, a law with a specific geographic reach may need to justify not
only the need for the law but also the differential need for the law in some areas
rather than others. Does the constitutional test require a record merely of
continued voting rights violations in the covered jurisdictions? Or does it
require a record of a greater frequency, tendency, or severity of such violations
in the covered, as opposed to uncovered, jurisdictions? 77 If the latter, then the
concerns expressed above become exacerbated, as an absence of differences
between the two classes of jurisdictions could either constitute evidence of the
law's successfil deterrent effect or it might suggest the arbitrariness of the
geographic choice the law makes. 78
Supporters of reauthorization decided that the safest course of action was
to stick with the coverage formula that the Supreme Court had previously
upheld. Despite the recognized need to extend coverage to the newest
generation of voting rights violators, constitutional and political constraints
prevented any alteration of the statute's geographic reach. The requirements of
the Boerne standard were sufficiently uncertain that any change in the coverage
formula was seen as an additional gamble on the ability of Congress to predict
what types of evidence the Court would find important. Moreover, the political
75. See Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance Senate Hearing, supra note 32, at 174-97 (statement of
Pamela S. Karlan) (arguing that the bill was sufficiently "congruent and proportional" to
survive constitutional scrutiny); Karlan, supra note 73, at 20-27.
76. See Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance Senate Hearing, supra note 32, at 62 & n.34 (statement of
Anita Earls, Director of Advocacy, University of North Carolina Law School Center for Civil
Rights, Chapel Hill, N.C.) ("Evidence that a law is being complied with is not a reason to
do away with it. If there were an environmental regulation that limited pollution levels,
cleaner air would not signify that it is no longer needed, but rather that it is sufficiently
serving its purpose. So long as the risk of pollution continues the law would need to be
renewed.").
77. On this point, see generally Ellen D. Katz, Not Like the South? Regional Variation and Political
Participation Through the Lens of Section 2, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF
2006: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER 183, 204-214 (Ana
Henderson ed., 2007).
78. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282-83 (1999) (reaffirming the
constitutionality of section 5 and the ability of Congress to address discrimination one step
at a time, instead of nationwide).
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hurdles of adding new jurisdictions, most of which likely would have been
Republican, to the preclearance regime made maintaining current coverage the
safest political choice. The new Act was therefore not an attempt to capture all
of the worst voting rights violators, but rather an effort to capture some of
them and to preserve historic gains where they had been made. As a result,
supporters of the Act sought to develop an evidentiary record for the principal
purpose of explaining why the covered jurisdictions should remain covered,
rather than justifying the coverage of certain jurisdictions but not others.
Despite considerable disagreement as to the sufficiency of the legislative
record for purposes of proving the law's constitutionality, very little
disagreement existed as to the facts on the ground. The legislative record
assembled principally in the House,79 but repeated in the Senate, contains four
categories of evidence to support reauthorization of the VRA: (1) statistics as to
minority voter turnout, registration, and rates of officeholding; (2) statistics
concerning DOJ and jurisdiction behavior with respect to the preclearance
process; (3) examples of voting rights violations in the covered jurisdictions;
and (4) data as to all VRA section 2 litigation nationwide. The hearings made
clear that the supporters and opponents of the bill differed principally as to
how to interpret and emphasize the evidence.
A. Rates of Minority Voter Turnout, Registration, and Officeholding
For the original VRA and the subsequent two reauthorizations, voter
turnout statistics represented one of two critical components to deciding which
jurisdictions should be covered. A jurisdiction with a voter turnout rate below
50% that also employed a "test or device," such as a literacy test, in the 1964
election would be covered under the original section 5.so This "trigger" or
79. Although the record appeared to be developed in the House and Senate, in truth the civil
rights community had begun developing the record for reauthorization well before. The
National Commission on the Voting Rights Act, an ad hoc coalition of civil rights
organizations, had held hearings around the country to document voting rights violations
and develop the record necessary for reauthorization. See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE VOTING
RIGHTS Acr, PROTECTING MINORITY VOTERS: THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT AT WORK 1982-2005
(20o6), available at http://www.votingrightsact.org/report/finalreport.pdf. Both the House
and the Senate included the study in the hearings. The House Report, H.R. REP. No. jo9-
478 (20o6), however, referenced it frequently, citing it over twenty-five times, while the
Senate Report, S. REP. No. 109-295 (20o6), largely ignored it. See also Tucker, supra note 18,
at 218 (describing the record developed by civil rights organizations prior to the House
hearings on the VRARA).
8o. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. 5§ 1973-19 73bb (2000) (amended 2006).
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coverage formula was reverse engineered in order to capture a foreseeable
group of jurisdictions, principally in the South."1 This original trigger, as well
as a subsequent amendment that included in the definition of "test or device"
English-only ballot materials in jurisdictions with a large number of non-
English speakers, was both overinclusive and underinclusive of discriminatory
jurisdictions.82 However, the formula roughly corresponded to jurisdictions
Congress found "guilty" and avoided the politically fraught task of merely
picking and choosing jurisdictions based on subjective judgments about their
relative lack of protection for minority voting rights.8" Moreover, any
jurisdictions erroneously captured by the coverage formula could simply "bail
out" by demonstrating in court their unproblematic voting rights records.
For the 2006 reauthorization, voter registration and turnout statistics-
either aggregate registration and turnout by state or differential registration
and turnout by racial group-did not help the cause much.84 Turnout rates in
the covered and uncovered jurisdictions do not differ consistently.8" Both the
House and the Senate Reports also noted the remarkable decrease in
differential registration and turnout rates among racial groups. The Senate
Report emphasized success, noting that in some covered jurisdictions
(California, Georgia, North Carolina, Mississippi, and Texas) African
81. Introductory Senate Hearings, supra note 32, at 21-22 (statement of Samuel Issacharoff).
82. Michael P. McDonald, Who's Covered? Coverage Formula and Bailout, in THE FUTURE OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 12, at 255, 257.
83. But see Karlan, Section 5 Squared, supra note 73, at 26 & nn.119-22 (explaining that political
considerations to avoid coverage of Texas and Arkansas played a role in the decision to have
literacy tests, rather than poll taxes, constitute part of the original trigger).
84. See RONALD KEITH GADD1E & CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III, MINORITY VOTING STUDIES OF
JURISDICTIONS COVERED BY SECTION FIVE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (2006), available at
http ://www.aei.org/research/nri/subjectAreas/pagelD. 1140,projectID.22/default.asp.
85. See Charles S. Bullock, III, & Ronald Keith Gaddie, Focus on the Voting Rights Act: Good
Intentions and Bad Social Science Meet in the Renewal of the Voting Rights Act, 5 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 1, 7 (2007) ("On both of the dimensions used to determine the jurisdictions to
which Section 5 would apply, the South compares well with other parts of the nation.").
Although with each election different states do better or worse, rates of voter turnout in
most of the covered southern states in the 2004 election are near the national mean or
below. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF
NOVEMBER 2004 (2006) [hereinafter CENSUS REPORT], available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2oo6pubs/p2o-556.pdf (providing turnout and registration
rates for various subsections of the population based on a census survey). The clustering of
the covered southern states at the bottom of the distribution is not as stark for the 2000
election, and for either of the two most recent elections, the differences between the top
quartile and bottom quartile do not exceed ten percentage points, although the covered
states are generally at or below the median.
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American turnout exceeded that of whites.8 6 The House Report also noted
success, but made express findings as to differential turnout rates for African
Americans in Virginia and South Carolina, and Hispanics in Texas and Florida,
that provided evidence of the continued need for section 5.17
Remarkably, both the House and Senate reports, when comparing black
and white turnout, count Hispanics as white instead of comparing non-
Hispanic white and black turnout. As a result, white turnout appears artificially
low and in some states makes black turnout appear to be a few percentage
points higher than white turnout. For example, the Senate Report notes higher
black turnout than white turnout in 2004 in Texas: blacks (55.8%), whites
(5o.6%), Hispanics (29.3%). s Those statistics are technically correct, yet once
Hispanics are taken out of the white category the picture changes considerably.
Non-Hispanic-white turnout in Texas in 2004 was 63.4%89-7.6 percentage
points higher than black turnout.9"
Although one can focus on a few bad states or aberrant years, turnout
statistics no longer capture the level of unconstitutional discrimination that
may exist in the covered or noncovered jurisdictions. African Americans
generally trail whites in turnout by between five and ten percentage points. 91
86. S. REP. No. 109-295, at 11 (2006).
87. See H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 25-32 (2006) (noting that in Virginia 68.2% of whites were
registered to vote in 2004 as compared to 57.4% of African Americans, in South Carolina
74.4% of whites were registered as compared to 71.1% of African Americans, in Florida
64.8% of whites were registered as compared to 38.2% of Latinos, and in Texas 61.5% of
whites are registered as compared to only 41.5% of Latinos).
88. S. REP. No. 1O9-295, at 11 (2006).
sg. U.S. Census Bureau, Reported Voting and Registration of the Total Voting-Age Population,
by Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin, for States: November 2004 (May 25, 2005), available at
http ://www.census.gov/populatiornsocdemo/voting/cps2oo4/tabo4a.xls.
go. When comparing the estimates of turnout of blacks and non-Hispanic whites in the 2004
election, the only two covered Southern states where black turnout appears to exceed non-
Hispanic white turnout are Alabama (where the difference is within the confidence interval)
and Mississippi (where the estimates differ by 6.9 percentage points). In North Carolina,
which is only partially covered by section 5, the estimate of black turnout in the 2004
election exceeded white turnout, although the 1.6 percentage point difference is within the
confidence interval. In the aggregate, black turnout lags non-Hispanic white turnout by
about 9 percentage points, but the covered jurisdictions do not depart systematically from
the average. Id.
g. See Paul R. Abramson & William Claggett, Race-Related Differences in Self-Reported and
Validated Turnout, 46 J. POL. 719 (1984); Jan E. Leighley & Arnold Vedlitz, Race, Ethnicity
and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations, 61 J. POL. 1092,
1108 (1999).
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States that disenfranchise felons prevent a substantial share of the African
American male population from voting, but the practice does not appear to
affect differential turnout between the covered and uncovered jurisdictions.2
Hispanics' extremely low voter turnout rates are due in large part to their
ineligibility to vote given their low rates of citizenship.93 The voter turnout
statistics presented in the House and Senate reports use voting age population
as the denominator, as opposed to citizen voting age population or eligible
voters. Because a large number of Hispanics in the voting population are
ineligible to register even if they wanted to, their turnout rates appear
dramatically lower than other racial groups.
Data in the House and Senate reports with respect to minority
officeholding reflected a similar pattern. Although minorities hold only about
5% of elected positions nationwide,94 as the committee reports noted, there has
been a very significant increase in the number of African Americans and
Hispanics holding positions in Congress and state legislatures. 9 The House
Report, however, noted minorities' underrepresentation as compared to their
share of the population. It emphasized that in the Deep South (Alabama,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and North Carolina), where
African Americans make up 35% of the population, they hold only 20.7% of the
seats in states legislatures -with even less frequent success in winning
statewide office. 9 6 The Senate Report struck a somewhat different tone,
pointing to near proportional representation for African Americans in the state
legislatures and congressional delegations from Georgia and Mississippi.97
92. See The Sentencing Project, Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States (Apr.
2007), available at
http ://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/publications/fdbs_fdlawsinus.pdf.
93. Benjamin Highton & Arthur L. Burris, New Perspectives on Latino Voter Turnout in the United
States, 30 AM. POL. RES. 285, 286-87 (2002) (finding that the thirty-one percentage point gap
drops to sixteen points when noncitizens are excluded).
94. See Zoltan Hajnal & Jessica Trounstine, Transforming Votes into Victories: Turnout,
Institutional Context, and Minority Representation in Local Politics, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT
REAUTHORIZATION OF 20o6: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER,
supra note 77, at 83, 84.
95- See H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 18 (2006) (noting that the number of African American
elected officials increased from 1469 in 1970 to over 9ooo in 2000); S. REP. No. 109-295, at
11-12 (2006) (describing the increase in the number of black and Latino public officials).
96. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 33 (20o6); NAT'L COMM'N ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra
note 79, at 37-39.
97. See S. REP. No. 109-295, at 33 (2006).
117:174 2007
THE PROMISE AND PITFALLS OF THE NEW VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Nothing in the record, however, pointed to a difference in rates of minority
officeholding between covered and uncovered jurisdictions.98
B. Evidence Concerning the Preclearance Process: Rates of Submissions, Denials,
and Requests for More Information
The threat to reauthorization posed by the success of the VRA becomes
clearest when considering the evidence concerning violations of section 5
itself.99 Preclearance behavior is the most easily measured and presented data
in the record, which contains rates of preclearance submissions, denials, and
requests for more information, as well as accounts as to the deterrent effect of
section 5.
Despite large increases in the volume of preclearance requests, the rate and
absolute number of DOJ denials of preclearance have declined in recent years.
Although the total number of preclearance denials (682) was greater for the
twenty-five years after the 1982 amendments than during the first seventeen
years of the VRA,'0 the rate of DOJ objections to preclearance requests has
decreased from over 4% in the first five years after the Voting Rights Act, to
between o.o% and 0.23% from 1983 to 2002.0 With only ninety-two total
objections in the last ten years, the annual objection rate since the mid-199os
has dropped to an average of less than o.2%.102
Much of that recent drop is due to changes in DOJ enforcement of the
discriminatory purpose prong of section 5 as mandated by the Supreme Court
in Reno v. Bossier Parish (Bossier Parish I/),1o3 which the VRARA overturns.
Nearly three-quarters of the objections from 199o to 2ooo involved purposeful
98. See DAVID A. BOSITIS, JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL & ECON. STUDIES, BLACK ELECTED
OFFICIALS: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY 16 (2001) (arraying data as to rates of African American
officeholding from all states which suggest no difference between the South and non-
South); Bullock & Gaddie, supra note 85, at 7.
99. See Hasen, supra note 68, at 190-93 (arguing that the DOJ's preclearance statistics provide
little evidence that the coverage formula remains congruent and proportional).
1oo. See Tucker, supra note 18, at 263 (citing to relevant portions of the congressional record).
101. Hasen, supra note 68, at 192 fig-3.
102. Modem Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing on S. 2703 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, logth Cong. 117 (2006) (statement of Wan J. Kim, Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil
Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (providing preclearance objection rates from
1965 to 2006).
103-. 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000).
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discrimination, with 43% based on purpose alone. 1°4 However, the Bossier
Parish II decision rejected discriminatory purpose (as opposed to retrogressive
purpose) as the purpose inquiry for section 5. Since that decision, the DOJ has
lodged only a handful of purpose-based objections."I
A better indicator of section 5's deterrent effect, however, might be the
number of DOJ "Requests for More Information" (MIRs) and the rate of
withdrawal of voting changes pursuant to such requests. 0 6 After all, the fact
that the preclearance regime leads to few denials could simply mean that the
section is working as intended. Like any other law, section 5's effectiveness
should not be evaluated by the number of times it is broken. The Voting
Section of the Civil Rights Division files a "Request for More Information"
when the submission from the jurisdiction does not provide all the information
needed to evaluate the potential retrogressive effect of a voting change. 07 An
MIR also represents a DOJ signal that the voting change might be found
retrogressive (and denied preclearance) unless the jurisdiction allays the DOJ's
concerns. Since 1982, DOJ has sent over 8oo requests for more information
regarding voting changes, leading jurisdictions to withdraw their submissions
in 205 instances and change their submissions in many others. ° Again, as a
total share of preclearance submissions, this represents a small fraction, but it
gives a sense of how many dogs did not bark as a result of the threat of a denial
of preclearance.
The same could be said regarding the testimony pointing to DOJ
negotiations with jurisdictions even before they submit a plan for preclearance.
Often a jurisdiction will work with the DOJ to ensure that a voting change that
104. See Peyton McCrary, Christopher Seaman & Richard Valelly, The Law of Preclearance:
Enforcing Section 5, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 12, at 26 tbl.2.2.
1os. Id. at 27. It is also possible that the Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. Bossier Parish School
Board (Bossier Parish 1), 520 U.S. 471 (1997), also led to a drop in denials. Prior to that case
the DOJ had assumed it could deny preclearance based on a jurisdiction's violation of
section 2 of the VRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). The Court rejected that interpretation and
therefore in the last ten years the DOJ has not been able to deny preclearance on that
ground.
1o6. On the deterrent effect of section 5 as revealed in MIRs, see Luis Ricardo Fraga & Maria
Lizet Ocampo, More Information Requests and the Deterrent Effect of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006: PERSPECTIvES ON
DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER, supra note 77, at 47. But see Need for Section 5 Pre-
Clearance Senate Hearing, supra note 32, at 112-14 (statement of Richard H. Pildes)
(questioning the significance of MIRs).
107. Voting Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Making Section 5 Submissions,
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/making.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
1o8. H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 40-41 (2006) (citing NAT'L COMM'N ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT,
supra note 79, at 58).
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might be retrogressive is altered, even before it is submitted, in a way that
ensures a grant of preclearance. These bargains occur in the shadow of section 5
without the threat of a preclearance denial needing to be exercised.10 9
C. Voting Rights Violations in Covered Jurisdictions
The hearings in the House and the Senate, as well as the committee
reports, are replete with examples of voting rights violations in covered
jurisdictions.1"0 Evidence of violations falls into three principal categories:
actual court decisions finding unconstitutional deprivation of the right to vote,
examples and case studies describing such deprivations, and systematic data
detailing violations of section 2 of the VRA. If the Court upholds section 5
against constitutional challenge, it will most likely do so based on these types
of evidence, as opposed to the other types discussed above.
The Senate Report identified only six published cases arising in covered
jurisdictions since 1982 where a court has found unconstitutional
discrimination against minorities with respect to the right to vote."' It found
an equal number in the uncovered jurisdictions," 2 as well as an equal number
of successful claims made by white voters."3 Those data certainly understate
the total number of cases because many generic voting rights claims are not
counted as alleging racial discrimination, while still others do not appear in the
official reports or databases from which those cases were drawn. Nevertheless,
even if the actual number is three or four times what the committees found, it
still amounts to less than one successful case per year in the covered
jurisdictions, and the lack of a difference with the uncovered jurisdictions (let
alone cases brought by white voters) is notable. Again, the scarcity of evidence,
as well as the lack of an identified difference between the covered and
uncovered jurisdictions, could be due to the successful operation of section 5,
which would have prevented many such violations in the covered jurisdictions,
especially when the DOJ denied preclearance to any law with a discriminatory
purpose. Moreover, the amended section 2, passed in 1982, led to more
iog. See Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance Senate Hearing, supra note 32, at 53-54 (statement of Anita
S. Earls, Director of Advocacy, Center for Civil Rights, University of North Carolina School
of Law).
iio. The Appendix to the Senate Committee Report, which describes these cases, is almost 300
pages long. S. REP. No. 109-295 apps. I-III, at 65-363 (2006).
i1i. S. REP. No. 109-295, at 13 (2006).
11z. Id.
113. Id.
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litigation under section 2 of the VRA instead of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. Because litigation under section 2 does not require a
demonstration of discriminatory intent as constitutional challenges do, it is not
surprising that most such cases do not show up in the totals of the Senate
Report. With those qualifications about how the record might be "tainted," the
low number of court-identified cases of constitutional violations in the covered
jurisdictions represents a data vacuum that has been a focal point for the law's
critics.114
A determination of the constitutional sufficiency of the evidentiary record
provided by Congress will likely rise or fall based on the avalanche of case
studies of voting rights violations in the covered jurisdictions assembled by the
civil rights community and presented to the Committees.' Those examples
range from Jim Crow-like suppression to more subtle forms of voting rights
deprivations." 6 They describe outright intimidation and violence against
minority voters," 7 discriminatory administration of elections," 8 disparate
treatment in registration and voting," 9 minority vote dilution and racial
gerrymandering,'20 and bias against non-English speakers.' 2 '
114. See Abigail Thernstrom & Edward Blum, Op-Ed., Voting Rights Act: After 40 Years, It's Time
for Virginia To Move On ... , RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 1, 2005, at Ail; see also
Bullock & Gaddie, supra note 85, at 3 ("Relatively little effort was invested in demonstrating
widespread problems in compliance with the statute or the law's coverage. Instead
legislators repeatedly pointed to a handful of examples to explain why they opposed
allowing any covered jurisdictions to escape Section 5."); Abigail Thernstrom, Editorial,
Emergency Exit, N.Y. SUN, July 29, 2005, at lo.
115. See generally NAT'L COMM'N ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, HIGHLIGHTS OF HEARINGS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (2005) [hereinafter HEARING
HIGHLIGHTS] (assembling cases of voting rights violations in covered jurisdictions).
116. Senator Kennedy highlighted the following examples in his floor speech during the
reauthorization debate: the DOJ's purpose-based objection to Kilmichael, Mississippi's
cancellation of an election three weeks before election day; the discriminatory moving of a
polling place in Dinwiddle, Virginia; and the failure of the DOJ to deny preclearance to the
Georgia photo identification law and the Texas re-redistricting. 152 CONG. REC. S7967
(daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
117. See, e.g., HEARING HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 115, at 4 (describing voter intimidation in Texas
including the burning of the home of a campaign staff treasurer of a black candidate).
118. See, e.g., id. at 4-5 (describing the discriminatory moving of polling places in Black Belt
counties in South Carolina and in Latino areas in Texas).
11g. See, e.g., id. at 4-6, 8, 11 (describing discrimination in registration and voting in South
Carolina, Texas, Alabama, and Arizona); id. at 35-36 (describing Georgia photo
identification law).
12o. See, e.g., id. at 57, 68, 73 (describing vote dilution in California and Mississippi and an
attempted racial gerrymander in Virginia).
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The best attempt at a large-scale empirical study to demonstrate the
different voting rights records of the covered and uncovered jurisdictions arose
with respect to the rate of section 2 violations. The study, overseen by
University of Michigan Law School Professor Ellen Katz, analyzed all of the
published opinions in 331 lawsuits since 1982 in which courts addressed a
section 2 claim." The study found that a little more than half of reported
section 2 cases were filed in noncovered jurisdictions, but that the rate of
success for plaintiffs was about ten percentage points greater in covered
jurisdictions (42.5% success rate, as opposed to 32.2% success rate in the
noncovered areas) .123 This is despite the fact that only the covered jurisdictions
were constrained by section 5, and that the DOJ for much of this period
prevented laws violating section 2 from going into effect. The study also found
that most of the so-called Senate Factors,' 4 indicating a history and present
m. See, e.g., id. at 8, 24, 34 (describing the importance of language assistance in Arizona and
discrimination against Hispanics in North Carolina and New York City).
122. See Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act Since 1982: Final Report of the Voting Rights Initiative, University of
Michigan Law School, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 654 (2006). The Michigan study was
inserted into the record in the House. See To Examine the Impact and Effectiveness of the Voting
Rights Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
lo9th Cong. 964 (2005). Although I stress the importance of the study here, I do not want
to overemphasize its prominence in the legislative record. It was summarized by the
National Commission on the VRA Report, referenced by several witnesses, inserted into the
record, and cited in the House Report. See H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 53 n.133 (2006); NAT'L
COMM'N ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 79, at 82-85; Publications Citing the Final
Report of the Voting Rights Initiative (Mar. 18, 2007),
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/votingrights/files/citations.pdf (pointing to citations in the
VRARA legislative history citing the Michigan Report). It was not the subject of concerted
debate among witnesses or members of Congress.
123. As stated in the Michigan study:
Of the 123 successful plaintiff outcomes documented, 68 originated in covered
jurisdictions, and 55 elsewhere. Plaintiffs in covered jurisdictions also won a
higher percentage of the cases decided than did those in non-covered areas. Of the
171 lawsuits published involving non-covered jurisdictions, 32.2% ended favorably
for plaintiffs, while 42.5% of the 16o lawsuits from covered jurisdictions produced
a result favorable to the plaintiffs.
Katz et al., supra note 122, at 6S5-56.
124. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44-45, 50-51 (1986). The Senate factors are: (1) a
history of official discrimination in voting; (2) racially polarized voting; (3) use of
enhancing practices, such as at-large elections and majority vote requirements; (4)
discrimination in candidate slating; (5) ongoing effects of discrimination in areas such as
education, employment, and health; (6) racial appeals in campaigns; (7) lack of success of
minority candidates; (8) significant lack of responsiveness of elected officials to the minority
community; and (9) a tenuous policy justification for the challenged practice.
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practice of discrimination (intended or not), were more prevalent in suits
lodged against covered jurisdictions. 12
Of the Senate Factors analyzed in the set of reported cases, the starkest
difference between the covered and noncovered jurisdictions concerns the
extent of racial bloc voting. ' 26 The number of successful cases in which a court
found legally significant racial bloc voting is virtually the same between the
covered (fifty-two decisions) and uncovered (fifty-three decisions)
jurisdictions. 12 7 However, of the elections analyzed in cases where racial bloc
voting was found, white bloc voting was found to be much higher in covered
jurisdictions.12s One way to get a sense of the extent of racial bloc voting is to
look at the share of elections in which whites vote as a bloc at the 8o% level -
that is, elections where at least 8o% of whites voted against the minority
candidate of choice. Of the universe of cases that find racial bloc voting, the
study found that in 81% of the elections analyzed for covered jurisdictions, but
only 41% of the elections analyzed for noncovered jurisdictions, whites voted as
a bloc at the 8o% level.
1 29
These findings are consistent with others that find differences between the
South and non-South with respect to the extent of racially polarized voting. In
particular, for African Americans in the South, a greater share of a given district
needs to be African American in order for an African American to be elected.'30
125. See Katz, supra note 77, at 193. All of the Senate Factors, except factors 2 (racial bloc voting),
4 (candidate slating), and 8 (lack of responsiveness), appeared more prevalent in the
reported cases from the covered jurisdictions. It might be worth noting that only three
factors showed any statistically significant difference between the covered and noncovered
jurisdictions: (i) a history of official discrimination in voting; (3) use of enhancing practices,
such as at-large elections and majority vote requirements; and (7) lack of success of minority
candidates. Id.
126. See id. at 195-97 (summarizing the findings of the Michigan study); Katz et al., supra note
122, at 657.
127. Katz et al., supra note 122, at 665.
128. Katz, supra note 77, at 220 tbl.8. 5.
129. Id. The elections in which racial bloc voting is discovered by a court are hardly a
representative sample of elections, of course. Moreover, analyzing the number of elections as
opposed to the number of cases or jurisdictions necessarily warps one's conclusions as to the
prevalence of racial bloc voting in covered versus noncovered jurisdictions. If the Supreme
Court will be relying on data from published section 2 cases, though, the rates of extreme
bloc voting identified in such cases might provide some indication of systematic differences.
130. See David L. Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Trends in Minority Representation, 1974 to 2000, in
THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 12, at 65; see also Understanding the
Benefits and Costs of Section 5 Pre-Clearance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
lo9th Cong. 133 (2006) (statement of Nathaniel Persily) (pointing to differences between
the South and non-South concerning necessary black population shares for a district to elect
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To be sure, much of the "racial" polarization in voting patterns can be
explained by (or at least correlated with) divergent party preferences between
whites and minorities. 31 Insofar as racial polarization merely stands for the
proposition that minorities and whites tend to vote for different candidates, we
should not be surprised to find higher rates of racial bloc voting in the South,
given that whites are more uniformly Republican in the South.'32 In other
words, the lesser ability of minorities to elect their preferred general election
candidates in the South due to the relative unwillingness of southern whites to
vote for Democrats shows up as racially polarized voting. Whether one deems
this confounding variable important depends on whether one cares about the
so-called causes of racial polarization in the electorate, as opposed to the simple
fact that such polarization, when interacting with at-large elections or certain
districting plans, has the effect of reducing minority electoral opportunity.133
Moreover, the legislative record includes many examples indicating racial
polarization apart from arenas of partisan competition.134 Although party
preferences may explain divergent preferences of racial groups in general
elections, they would not be able to explain racially polarized voting in
nonpartisan races or Democratic party primaries.
As the study itself recognizes, there are plenty of reasons to quibble with
(or qualify) the findings of the Michigan study.' Moreover, evidence of
a black candidate); HEARING HIGHLIGHTS, supra note i15, at 7-8 (citing testimony of Richard
Engstrom regarding the high rates of racial polarization in seven southern states).
131. See Bernard Grofman & Thomas Brunell, Extending Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The
Complex Interaction Between Law and Politics, in THE FuTuRE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT,
supra note 12, at 311, 317-18 (noting that racial bloc voting along party lines makes it harder
for black candidates to win office); Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at
the Turn of a Century, 50 VAND. L. REV. 291, 314-20 (1997) (describing the relationship
between partisanship and racial bloc voting in the South).
132. See DAVID LUBLIN, THE REPUBLICAN SOUTH: DEMOCRATIZATION AND PARTISAN CHANGE
(2004) (explaining the rise and dominance of the Republican Party in the South); Karlan,
supra note 131, at 314-20.
133. There is a healthy debate in the circuits, in addition to among the Justices in Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 5O-51 (1986), as to whether one must control for party in racial bloc
voting analysis. See Katz et al., supra note 122, at 665-70; see also infra notes 18o-186 and
accompanying text (describing the debate in Gingles).
134. See H.R. REP. NO.109-478, at 34-35 (2006); NAT'L COMM'N ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT,
supra note 79, at 91-92.
135. Relying on reported cases, let alone successful reported cases, necessarily skews the results
in that such cases may represent an incomplete and biased selection of jurisdictions, election
laws, or the relative prevalence of discriminatory election laws. See Katz, supra note 77, at 187
n.14 (explaining inevitable incompleteness of the Michigan study); Katz et al., supra note
122, at 65S (suggesting that the total number of lawsuits may be five times larger than the
number of reported opinions); see also HEARING HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 11S, at 84-85
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successful section 2 cases (to the extent a geographic pattern does exist) does
not necessarily indicate a greater prevalence or tendency toward
unconstitutional violations of voting rights. One might argue that a greater
threat to constitutional rights is posed, in general, by jurisdictions with laws
that have discriminatory effects as defined by section 2. However, violations of
the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments require a showing of intentional
discrimination. '36 Thus, for example, a high rate of use of dilutive at-large
(discussing limitations of the Michigan study and pointing to evidence suggesting the
number of filed section 2 lawsuits is larger); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the
Voting Rights Act, 1o8 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming Jan. 2008) (manuscript at 36-40, on file
with The Yale Law Journal) (describing selection biases of relying on reported section 2
cases).
First, the number of lawsuits might be due to strategic decisions by civil rights lawyers
or the disproportionate presence of certain governmental forms, such as at-large elections,
in covered jurisdictions, just as it might be due to the disproportionate presence of
unconstitutional state action. Moreover, the total population of the covered jurisdictions is
much lower than that of the uncovered jurisdictions. The study does not "weight" the two
categories of jurisdictions either by the number of people living in the jurisdictions or by the
relative proportions of racial minorities.
Second, the number of successful lawsuits does not indicate how severe the adjudicated
voting rights violations were. If the covered jurisdictions tend to commit more egregious
violations than the uncovered jurisdictions -even if they commit the same "number" of
violations or lose the same number of lawsuits -the relative severity of their violations
remains constitutionally relevant. A lawsuit that uncovers a state policy found to
disenfranchise a sizable portion of the state's population would "count" equally with a
lawsuit demonstrating that a local town council's redistricting plan unintentionally dilutes
minority votes.
Third, although some covered jurisdictions may have violated section 2 quite often and
severely, many have never violated it. The case data may help justify coverage of those
jurisdictions found to violate section 2, but not justify the coverage formula per se. The data
are skewed, in effect, because a subset of the covered jurisdictions has been found guilty of
race-based vote dilution. If one or two of the worst states were subtracted from the dataset,
then the covered and uncovered jurisdictions would appear to have the same number of
violations.
Finally, preliminary data from the last five years suggest the gap between covered and
noncovered jurisdictions may have diminished or reversed, with the total number of
successful section 2 cases declining and the share of successful lawsuits in uncovered
jurisdictions outpacing the share in covered jurisdictions. See Katz, supra note 77, at 215
tbl.8.1 (finding plaintiffs succeeding in 20.7% of section 2 cases in covered jurisdictions and
23.9% of cases in noncovered jurisdictions from 2000 to 2005). It is unclear why the recent
data differ from those of the earlier decades or whether by 201o the decade of the 2ooos will
show a similar regional pattern as the 199os.
136. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 5 (198o).
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voting systems, the most prevalent section 2 violation in the VRA's early
years, 37 does not necessarily indicate a high rate of constitutional violations.' 38
With all of these qualifications and caveats, the data concerning section 2
violations, and particularly the relative prevalence of racially polarized voting,
provides the best systematic evidence to distinguish covered from noncovered
jurisdictions. There are ways to explain these differences away, but the section
2 case data will provide the greatest help for a court wishing to hang its hat on
systematic data that justifies the current coverage formula. Turnout rates
cannot perform this function as they did previously, and the many examples of
voting rights violations in the record will only suffice if the Court decides
evidence exclusively from the covered jurisdictions satisfies the Boerne
standard. Reliance on almost any of the voting data in the record to prove a
greater need for section 5 in the currently covered jurisdictions, however, must
account for the fact that the successful operation of section 5 will prevent the
emergence of the type of evidence that would best justify its continued
operation.
III. WHY THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE LAW REMAINS INTACT
In the end, the bill that became law was virtually unchanged from the
original version that the House and Senate Committees considered in their first
hearings on the subject. The new VRA keeps the same structure as the old
VRA, while overturning Supreme Court decisions thought to limit it. The
same jurisdictions remain covered, the bailout procedures remain intact, the
DOJ retains its special place in the preclearance regime, and the legislation was
reauthorized once again for twenty-five years. 139 The two most notable changes
were the alterations in the standards for what constitutes discriminatory
purpose and discriminatory effect. Overturning Bossier Parish 11,140 the new law
makes clear that mere discriminatory purpose- regardless of whether such
purpose seeks to make minorities worse off than the status quo -is grounds for
a denial of preclearance. 141 Overturning Georgia v. Ashcroft, 42 the legislation
137. See Katz, supra note 77, at 192-93.
138. Id. at 211-13 & n.145.
139. The law also retains the language assistance provisions of section 203, as well as updates to
provisions concerning federal observers and the provision of expert witness fees in
litigation. See Tucker, supra note 18, at 223-32.
140. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320, 335 (2000) (interpreting
discriminatory purpose to mean retrogressive purpose).
141. 42 U.S.CA. § 1973c(c) (West Supp. 2007).
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requires denials of preclearance when voting laws "diminish[] the ability" of
minorities to "elect their preferred candidates of choice. ",'43
The discussion in this Part explains why Congress could not merely have
tinkered with the law in ways that would have updated the provisions that
critics of the law find most disturbing. If the can of worms that is the basic
structure of section 5 had been opened, the political coalition behind the law
would have collapsed or Congress would likely have needed to revamp the
VRA completely. In addition to the well-known political constraints, the
shadow cast by the Supreme Court's federalism decisions stultified the
available options for reforming section 5's key provisions.
A. Retaining the Same Coverage Formula
As discussed above, the coverage formula for section 5 is both overinclusive
and underinclusive of jurisdictions of concern with respect to their record of
minority voting rights violations. Such was the case in 1965 and it remains so
today. The statute attempts to address the imperfect fit by providing for
bailout of "good" jurisdictions and "bail in" of jurisdictions that courts
determine should be included in the preclearance regime because of an
identified voting rights violation. 144 At least in the abstract, though, it is
difficult to defend a formula which, for example, covers counties in Michigan
and New Hampshire,'14 but does not cover the counties in Ohio and Florida
with the most notorious voting rights violations in recent elections. The most
one can say in defense of the formula is that it is the best of the politically
feasible alternatives or that changing the formula would sufficiently disrupt
settled expectations that it is better to go with the devil we know than one we
do not.
What became clear throughout the reauthorization process was that a
debate over the coverage formula would turn into a debate about the purpose
and utility of section 5 itself. Such a debate likely would have led to the
142. 539 U.S. 461, 480 (2003).
143. 42 U.S.C.A. 5 1973c(b) (West Supp. 2007). As described in greater detail below, Georgia v.
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003), redefined the "retrogression" standard in section 5 so as to
permit redistricting plans that opted for broader minority influence across a range of
districts or in the legislature as a whole as opposed to maintaining minorities' ability to elect
their candidates of choice. See infra notes 220-227 and accompanying text.
144. See 42 U.S.C. 5 1973a(c) (2ooo). This so-called pocket trigger allows a court to require a
jurisdiction to seek preclearance for an "appropriate time" if it has been found to violate the
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. See also infra Section III.B.
145. See supra note 3 (listing covered jurisdictions).
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complete unraveling of the bill. If Congress had added or subtracted
jurisdictions based on some new criteria then the justification for those criteria
would become the central political and constitutional question underlying the
bill. Congress would have needed to make some findings as to why these new
criteria roughly correspond (or more precisely, were "proportional and
congruent") to areas of concern with respect to minority voting rights
violations.
Nothing akin to the "neutral" triggers of past reauthorizations could have
achieved that easily. Those seeking to expand coverage struggled to find a
formula similar to the existing one that would capture an appropriate group of
jurisdictions while passing constitutional muster and not giving rise to
concerted political opposition. That turned out to be an impossible task. As
described above, voter turnout rates (either in the aggregate or racial
disparities) would not do so,, 46 nor would a history of successful voting rights
lawsuits (for example, cover all those jurisdictions that had been found guilty
of a violation of section 2 of the VRA). Moreover, no objective statistical criteria
could have added the most recent bad actors (Ohio and Florida) to the list of
currently covered jurisdictions. Indeed, as Richard Pildes has argued, the bad
actors of recent elections were discovered principally after the fact when a
competitive election and subsequent litigation exposed the problems in those
states' election laws and administration.
47
146. Representative Norwood's proposed amendment, H.R. REP. No. 109-554, at 3 (20o6),
would have updated coverage to include states with low voter turnout in recent elections.
147. If a similar light were projected on other states, similar problems would have been detected.
As discussed later, this point only goes to show that voting rights violators are difficult to
predict ex ante, and that we only really become concerned as a country about such violations
when they make a difference in an election. See generally Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance
Senate Hearing, supra note 32, at 198-207 (statement of Richard H. Pildes) (explaining the
difficulties of identifying potential voting rights violators before an election takes place).
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As with a decision to apply section 5 nationally,4 8 a decision to cherry-pick
such large and politically powerful states as Ohio and Florida would have sunk
the bill. It is one thing to retain coverage of jurisdictions that have lived with
the constraints of section 5 for some time; it is quite another to heap a new and
costly administrative scheme onto jurisdictions unaccustomed to needing
federal permission for their voting laws. Moreover, if the formula were tailored
to capture the most notorious alleged recent violators of minority rights, the
likely targets of increased coverage would have been Republican-controlled
states-and the Republican Congress should hardly be expected to increase
coverage to include solely those areas Democrats considered bad actors in
recent elections. Perhaps a deal could have been struck to include some
Democratic states that have been the subject of controversy, such as
Washington, which demonstrated its share of voting irregularities in its 2004
gubernatorial recount. Yet, those complaints were not race-based, and if
section 5 was going to become a generic troubleshooter for voting violations,
let alone "fraud" however defined, then the whole structure would need to
have been rethought.
The political obstacles to increased coverage reveal how political changes
since 1965 have transformed the meaning of section 5. As Samuel Issacharoff
and others have described at greater length, the original section 5 targeted
uncompetitive Dixiecrat jurisdictions and did not have any obvious partisan
effect.149 The specter, for example, of a politicized DOJ seeking to use the
preclearance process to serve partisan ends was not considered a serious
148. Expanding section 5 to the nation as a whole was considered politically infeasible and
constitutionally problematic. See Tucker, supra note 18, at 254, 262 (describing Congress's
consideration of potential coverage changes that would have applied the law nationwide);
ACLU Voting Rights: About the VRA, http://www.votingrights.org/more.php (last visited
Oct. 7, 2007 ) (arguing against nationwide application of section 5 because of the "volume of
voting changes that would have to be reviewed" and because it would no longer
appropriately focus on jurisdictions where there is a history of voting discrimination).
National coverage would require a Voting Section of the DOJ about five times bigger than it
currently is. Moreover, the fact that section 5 was geographically targeted has always been
seen as one of its constitutional saving graces. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
626-27 (2000) ("By contrast [to the Violence Against Women Act], the [VRA] § 5 remedy
upheld in Katzenbach v. Morgan ... was directed only to the State where the evil found by
Congress existed, and in South Carolina v. Katzenbach ... the remedy was directed only to
those States in which Congress found that there had been discrimination.").
149. See Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104
COLUM. L. REv. 1710, 1713 (2004) ("As long as the [covered jurisdictions] remained entirely
Democratic, the tremendous powers given to the federal government to intercede in local
political affairs in the covered jurisdictions could not be used for partisan gain."); cf. Persily,
supra note 12, at 226 ("When Congress first passed the Voting Rights Act, the Republican
Party was almost completely absent from the 'Solid South.'").
THE PROMISE AND PITFALLS OF THE NEW VOTING RIGHTS ACT
problem, nor was the coverage formula viewed as having a disparate impact on
one political party (even though most of the covered jurisdictions were
controlled by Democrats).
In 20o6, any decision to expand coverage would have needed to appear
politically evenhanded. As insulted as the currently covered jurisdictions were
to remain under the section 5 umbrella, any newly covered state would have
considered its addition to the preclearance regime as a national condemnation
of its recent voting rights record. The only way such a signal could have been
politically acceptable is if the eventual targets were not uniformly dominated by
one party (that is, Republicans). Extending coverage to the most high-profile
recent violators (or at least, to those that had received the most attention
because competitive elections in those states exposed vulnerabilities that were
more widely shared), therefore, would have required finding some criterion
that also added a few Democratic jurisdictions.
At the same time, any attempt to avoid disparate partisan treatment while
reforming the coverage formula must also comply with the congruence and
proportionality standard. In other words, the new coverage formula would
have to be both politically fair and justifiable as preventing or remedying
violations of voting rights. A slapdash choice of jurisdictions arising from a
political compromise to balance out the partisan effects of a new coverage
regime would be incongruent with the geography of voting rights violators
almost by definition. As unsatisfying and constitutionally risky as resigning the
VRA regime to its current geographical reach may be, tinkering with it would
have invited a whole host of unknown problems. Whatever its drawbacks, the
current coverage formula had the virtue of already having been upheld by the
Supreme Court.' While the coverage formula might be outdated, advocates
for the law at least would have stare decisis on their side and could force the
Court into the position of explaining why a previously constitutional law was
now unconstitutional.
B. Bailout
Given the inherent political difficulties involved with reform of the
coverage formula, altering the bailout procedures for section 5 appeared to be a
different way to constrain the reach of section 5 and improve the chances that
15o. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 284-85 (1999); City of Rome v. United States,
446 U.S. 156 (198o); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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the Court would uphold it.'"' Professor Richard Hasen and Congressman Lynn
Westmoreland supported a proactive bailout measure that would have freed
jurisdictions from coverage if the Attorney General determined they met the
current criteria and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
agreed.1, 2 Anything that increased the likelihood that "good" jurisdictions
could escape from coverage would make the constitutionality of the coverage
formula easier to defend. Although the existing coverage formula may not pick
up all the "bad" jurisdictions, the argument goes, an eased bailout mechanism
would at least ensure that coverage was merely underinclusive, but not
overinclusive.
The requirements for bailout remained unchanged in the reauthorized
VRA. Although the statutory requirements are somewhat detailed," 3 they
basically require the covered jurisdiction to prove to the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia that in the previous ten years it has not violated the
voting rights of its citizens, has fully complied with its preclearance
obligations, has taken affirmative steps to prevent potential VRA violations and
has included minorities in the apparatus of election administration. Although
several jurisdictions successfully bailed out of the original VRA and the two
subsequent reauthorizations, only fourteen counties (all in Virginia) have
successfully bailed out since 1982, and no others have attempted to do so.' s4
151. See generally J. Gerald Hebert, An Assessment of the Bailout Provisions of the Voting Rights Act,
in VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 20o6: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY,
PARTICIPATION, AND POWER, supra note 77, at 257 (describing the history of bailout);
McDonald, supra note 82 (describing the history of bailout and exploring alternatives).
152. See Rick Hasen, Drafting a Proactive Bailout Measure for VRA Reauthorization, Election Law
Blog, May 18, 20o6, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/oos655.html (presenting drafted
language that would put the "proactive bailout" measure into effect).
153. As set out in 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (2000), the criteria for a declaratory judgment granting
bailout require a jurisdiction to prove that during the preceding ten years it has not used a
test or device to abridge the right to vote, has not been found by a court to have violated
minority voting rights, has not been assigned federal examiners, has fully complied with its
preclearance obligations, has not received an objection from the DOJ, has eliminated
discriminatory or dilutive voting practices, and has engaged in constructive efforts to
incorporate minorities into the process of election administration.
154. See Voting Section, supra note 3, n.1, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/
sec_5/covered.htm#notei (last visited Oct. 7, 2007) (explaining that fourteen political
divisions in Virginia have "bailed out" from section 5 coverage). See generally J. Gerald
Hebert, An Assessment of the Bailout Provisions of the Voting Rights Act, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT
REAUTHORIZATION OF 20o6: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER,
supra note 77, at 257 (describing what successful bailout has entailed); McDonald, supra note
82 (providing an excellent discussion of the history of bailout).
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The infrequency of bailout in the last twenty-five years may indicate that
the requirements for bailout are simply too stringent. There are probably
dozens of local jurisdictions that could make the required showing if they
wanted to, but for some reason they have not. For some jurisdictions, perhaps
the cost of hiring lawyers to make the bailout request and the uncertainty as to
how such an effort would be received by the relevant court have retarded
efforts to free some of the jurisdictions from coverage."' 5 If that is true, then
bailout exists more as a fictitious way out of coverage than an authentic way of
shoring up the constitutionality of the coverage formula.
However, other theories, apart from the "burdensome bailout" hypothesis,
may explain the pattern over the last twenty-five years. The covered
jurisdictions that could bail out most easily may find coverage to be least
burdensome. In other words, even if bailout is relatively easy and feasible, a
jurisdiction that lives comfortably under the preclearance regime may have very
little incentive to liberate itself from what others consider a burdensome
administrative procedure. The covered townships in Michigan and New
Hampshire, for example, are almost completely white and have never been the
subject of a preclearance denial. Nevertheless, these jurisdictions have never
tried to bail out. Indeed, even for those jurisdictions that might be borderline
cases for bailout, the preclearance process may not be as burdensome as many
think. The DOJ objects to less than 1% of submissions even from the most
historically guilty jurisdictions, so remaining covered, once a jurisdiction has
the administrative apparatus in place, may not be an onerous requirement."l 6
Related to this first hypothesis is a second: some jurisdictions may prefer to
remain covered rather than to bail out. As strange as it might seem for a
jurisdiction to desire to pay the marginal cost of coverage, certain benefits may
accrue from coverage. With a DOJ grant of preclearance comes a certain signal
as to the legality of a voting change. To be sure, preclearance does not mean the
change is legal, just that it is not retrogressive. However, a DOJ stamp of
approval could be a powerful political message to those who might otherwise
object to a voting change. As such, the preclearance process might deter
155. See Letter from Marguerite Mary Leon, Robert Naylor & Christopher E. Skinnell to James
Sensenbrenner 238-48 (Nov. 29, 2005), available at http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/
16febuoo6113o/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/io9hrg/24o34.pdf (describing the
difficulties the bailout provision presents to Yuba County, California).
1s6. See S. REP. No. 109-295, at 13-14 (2006) (citation omitted) (showing that the annual percent
of submissions receiving objection letters was under 1% for every year from 1983 to 2006).
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litigation that otherwise would materialize if the voting change had not been
vetted.' "
Finally, the infrequency of bailout might be the product more of a public
relations phenomenon than a legal one. Politicians who seek to remove their
jurisdictions from the preclearance regime would need to confront the obvious
questions: "Why don't you want to ensure that your changes to voting laws are
legal?" In essence, "What are you trying to hide or what are you afraid of?" Of
course, there are many adequate responses to such questions, but releasing
one's jurisdiction from important civil rights legislation is hardly a battle worth
waging for most politicians. Better to suffer the inconveniences of preclearance
than to be tagged as a politician against civil rights.
No one knows which of these theories best explains the relative absence of
bailouts since 1982. Each probably has a kernel of truth for some subset of
jurisdictions. However, if we do not know why jurisdictions have chosen not to
bail out, we cannot adapt the bailout regime to account for its alleged
shortcomings. Although it would have been politically easier to change the
bailout requirements than to change the coverage formula, the supporters of
reauthorization were steadfast in their opposition to an altered bailout
regime.58 There was great fear, I think, that making bailout easier would be a
camel's nose under the tent that would have upended the coverage regime.
Adjusting the bailout regime with the intent that "good" jurisdictions would
not be unfairly covered might morph into an accidental release from coverage
of several "bad" jurisdictions.
C. The Section 5 Enforcement Regime
In addition to changing which jurisdictions might need to seek
preclearance, Congress could have considered how the preclearance process
worked. In particular, Congress could have altered the central and
extraordinary role the DOJ plays in granting permission for changes in voting
157. See Reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act's Temporary Provisions: Policy Perspectives and Views
from the Field: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo 9 th Cong. 314 (2006) (statement of Donald M. Wright,
General Counsel, N.C. State Board of Elections) ("Section 5 can vindicate governmental
units from allegations of discrimination or adverse racial effects. It provides a 'seal of
approval' that a voting change is not discriminatory because the USDOJ has precleared the
change." (emphasis omitted)).
158. See Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Challenges Lawmakers Who Aim To
Gut Voting Rights Act, Says Proposals Would Eliminate Historic Federal Protections (June
23, 20o6), available at http://www.aclu.org/votingrights/gen/25988prs2oo6o623.html.
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laws. Critics of the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division have frequently
accused its lawyers of being ideologues, particularly when it comes to the
construction (or alleged maximization) of majority-minority districts or their
propensity to find discriminatory purposes wherever they looked for them.'19
However, in recent years, the allegations of ideological extremism have been
replaced by charges of partisan infection of the preclearance process. In
particular, the much-publicized divisions between the career attorneys and the
political appointees concerning the Georgia and Arizona photo identification
laws, the re-redistricting of Texas,16 and the holdup of the Mississippi
congressional redistricting plan gave rise to charges that partisan concerns had
come to steer the granting or withholding of preclearance in a few high-profile
cases. 6' In the face of these allegations, academics suggested judicial review of
grants of preclearance might check any partisan excesses in the DOJ's
administration of section 5.
Elsewhere I have described in greater detail the shortcomings of judicial
review of preclearance decisions modeled on review of administrative agency
adjudication."' The chief difficulties arise from the massive number of
submissions the DOJ receives and the opportunity for gamesmanship that
appeals would provide any party aggrieved by a grant of preclearance.
Moreover, allowing appeals from section 5 runs the risk of duplicating
15g. See Section 5 Renewal Senate Hearing, supra note 32, at 142 (statement of Michael A- Carvin,
Partner, Jones Day) ("It is well documented, however, that the Justice Department routinely
finds discriminatory purpose every time the submitting authority fails to create the
maximum number of minority opportunity districts.").
16o. See Section 5 Recommendation Memorandum from Tim Mellett et al., Attorneys and Staff,
Voting Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice to Robert S. Berman, Deputy Chief, Voting Section,
Dep't of Justice (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter DOJ Memo], available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/texasDOJmemo.pdf. In
fairness to the political appointees, the re-redistricting, for all its other shortcomings,
presented a close call under the retrogression test of Georgia v. Ashcrofi, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
If not for the fact that the minority legislators in Texas (unlike Georgia) were uniformly
against the plan, the changes in racial percentages alone probably would not constitute
retrogression.
i6i. See Persily, supra note 12, at 227; see also Jeffrey Toobin, Poll Position: Is the Justice Department
Poised To Stop Voter Fraud-or To Keep Voters from Voting?, NEW YORKER, Sept. 20, 2004, at
56 ("The main business of the Voting Section is still passing judgment on legislative
redistricting in areas that have a history of discrimination. Under Ashcroft, its actions
consistently favored Republicans-for instance, in Georgia, where the department
challenged the Democrats' gerrymander, and in Mississippi, where the Voting Section
stalled the redistricting process for so long that a pro-Republican redistricting plan went
into effect by default.").
162. See Persily, supra note 12, at 232. As mentioned therein, I am indebted to Samuel Issacharoff
for many of these points.
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litigation under section 2 of the VRA. It also would increase the federalism
costs by making the process less automatic and more time consuming for
jurisdictions attempting to implement voting laws.
When operating as intended, the nearly automated preclearance process
forces transparency in policymaking and an outside check on the covered
jurisdictions that seek to pass subtly discriminatory voting laws. While shifting
the burden of proof to the jurisdictions to prove nondiscrimination in their
voting changes, the section 5 architecture rests on assumptions that
preclearance determinations are nonpartisan in both intent and effect. As the
South has become politically competitive and the federal bureaucracy more
partisan across the board, those assumptions have become outdated.
As with the coverage formula, though, altering the DOJ's enforcement role
would not have constituted mere tinkering around the edges of the structure of
section 5. The preclearance procedures in section 5 are completely unlike
anything else in the U.S. Code, given their inversion of the normal federal-
state relationship. As mentioned above, there were good reasons for that
extraordinary statutory architecture in the earliest incarnations of the VRA, and
no doubt the preclearance regime still constrains many potential voting rights
violators, particularly at the local level.163 Were Congress to change this basic
aspect of section 5, however, it would be passing a very different law, not
simply a modified version of a law that has operated relatively smoothly for
forty years. 16 4
IV. THE NEW STANDARD FOR RETROGRESSION
The congressional effort expended in building a record of discriminatory
voting practices overwhelmed any discussion about what the most significant
development in the law-the change in the retrogression standard- actually
163. See Michael J. Pitts, Let's Not Call the Whole Thing Off Just Yet: A Response to Samuel
Issacharoffs Suggestion To Scuttle Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 84 NEB. L. REv. 605, 612-14
(2005).
164. To avoid overstating the significance of altering the preclearance procedures, I should
reemphasize one proposal I have made in earlier writing. See Persily, supra note 12, at 231-33.
It may have been possible to excise certain types of voting laws from DOJ preclearance and
force them into the courts in the first instance. For example, one could have envisioned a law
that required statewide redistricting plans to be submitted to the courts while all other
voting changes, which are usually immediately precleared, could be given to the DOJ. Doing
so would not get out of the problem of replicating section 2 litigation in the judicial
preclearance of redistricting plans. However, it might avoid the problem of unmanageability
were all voting changes thrust into the courts. It also might combat partisanship in the
preclearance process in the contexts where it is most likely to be present.
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means.16s Congress intended this revision to overturn the Supreme Court's
decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft, which allowed jurisdictions more flexibility in
how minorities could be distributed in new redistricting plans.166 The new
retrogression standard or "Ashcroft fix" makes clear that preclearance should be
denied to any redistricting plan (or any voting law) that "has the purpose of or
will have the effect of diminishing the ability of any citizens of the United
States on account of race or color [or language minority status] . . .to elect
their preferred candidates of choice . ... ,,,6' How one determines such
diminution remains an open and central question concerning the proper
operation of the amended VRA.
165. I do not explore in great detail here the other major change in the law: the overruling of
Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320 (2000), to establish that a
discriminatory purpose, not merely a retrogressive purpose, constitutes grounds for a denial
of preclearance. This change was less controversial, but its potential impact should not be
understated. Before Bossier Parish II took the legs out of the DOJ's purpose inquiry in the
preclearance process, discriminatory purpose constituted the basis for 43% of objections in
the 199os. See McCrary, Seaman & Valelly, supra note 104, at 20 (calculating the impact
Bossier Parish II had on the rate of preclearance denials). It is quite possible that the Bossier
Parish fix may turn out to be more important than the Ashcrofi fix when it comes to
(re)expanding DOJ authority. There is a risk that the purpose inquiry will turn into another
opportunity for partisan infection of the preclearance process-for example, with a
Democratic-leaning DOJ determining that all Republican gerrymanders in jurisdictions
with heavy minority populations have discriminatory purposes or finding that the failure to
maximize the number of majority-minority districts constitutes discriminatory purpose. I
suspect that the Court's decisions in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and its progeny will
act as a constraint on an overly aggressive DOJ. The purpose inquiry provides a lot of
discretion to the DOJ, however. Jurisdictions may feel that they must accede to DOJ
pressures applied in the short, stressful period preceding an election.
166. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 480 (2003).
167. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c(b) (West Supp. 2007). By its terms the Ashcroft fix (like the current
retrogression standard) does not limit itself to racial minorities. It only specifies the
prohibited grounds (namely, race) for diminution of voters' ability to elect their preferred
candidates. In theory, this means that one cannot diminish either the ability of whites or
that of minorities to elect their preferred candidates. Of course, if this were the correct
interpretation then most redistricting changes would be illegal, given that an increase in one
group's ability to elect its preferred candidates usually entails the decrease of another
group's similar ability. Neither the DOJ nor any court has interpreted section 5 to apply to
whites, and no one has even speculated that the new retrogression standard might apply to
whites as well. However, before last year almost no one thought section 2 of the VRA would
apply to whites either. Yet, in United States v. Brown, the DOJ launched its first section 2
lawsuit on behalf of white voters. See Complaint at 3, United States v. Brown, No. 4-4:05-
cv-33-TSL-LRA (S.D. Miss. Feb. 17, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/
voting/sec_2/noxubeecomp.pdf (alleging that Noxubee County systematically treated
white voters differently from similarly situated black voters).
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As explained above, there are good reasons why Congress left this
important provision undefined. The fractious Senate Report makes clear that
Democrats and Republicans hold dramatically differing views as to what this
standard requires. The other available legislative history elides the likely
political effects of various valid interpretations. The potential interpretations of
the law run the gamut from entrenching either Republican or Democratic
gerrymanders. The central conceptual disputes revolve around the types of
districts and candidates protected by the standard, the data necessary to
evaluate the ability to elect, and the degree of flexibility jurisdictions should be
accorded to adapt to political changes throughout the twenty-five year tenure
of this law. This Part attempts to grapple with these conceptual difficulties and
to propose a manageable interpretation of the new standard.
In arriving at such a standard, certain background principles are important
to avoid constitutional difficulty, to prevent thwarting the intent (to the extent
that it can be discerned) of the supporters of the law, to prevent perverse
effects, and to ensure that the enforcement authorities can administer the new
law. First, the interpretation of the new standard should not be a pretext for
furthering the interests of one or the other political party. The racialization of
partisan conflict through interpretation of the VRA should be avoided to the
extent possible. 68 Every interpretation will bias preclearance determinations in
favor or against one of the parties in a given instance, but at the initial stage of
describing what the statute should mean, interpretations that do not have
predictable partisan beneficiaries ought to be favored over ones that do.
Second, given that the statute will be in place for twenty-five years, the
standard ought to be flexible enough to adapt to changing political realities. An
interpretation of the standard that would freeze the current minority
percentages in all covered districts, for example, ignores the realistic possibility
that the percentages required for minorities to elect their preferred candidates
will likely change over time. This leads to the final, and perhaps most
controversial, initial principle: the interpretation of section 5 ought to further
the goal of moving toward an electoral system less plagued by racial
polarization.169 Each phrase of the new retrogression standard can be
168. This is especially true given the danger that the preclearance process will be used for
partisan gain by whichever party's appointees control the Voting Section at the Department
ofJustice.
169. See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 490-91 ("While courts and the Department of Justice should be
vigilant in ensuring that States neither reduce the effective exercise of the electoral franchise
nor discriminate against minority voters, the Voting Rights Act, as properly interpreted,
should encourage the transition to a society where race no longer matters: a society where
integration and color-blindness are not just qualities to be proud of, but are simple facts of
life.").
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interpreted in such a way as to make racial polarization and racial bloc voting
central to the meaning of the new section 5.'70 The capacity of a redistricting
plan to diminish minorities' ability to elect their preferred candidates depends
on the extent of racially polarized voting, which is widespread today but might
not be throughout the twenty-five-year tenure of this law.
The standard proposed in this Part allows for tradeoffs in minority
percentages among districts, while at the same time focusing on minorities'
ability to elect, rather than to influence, candidates. Section 5 should be read as
preventing new districting plans that reduce the aggregated probability across
districts that minorities will elect the candidates that they prefer and that
whites generally disfavor. This standard escapes the charges of partisan bias or
racial essentialism that would rightly be lodged against alternatives. Moreover,
throughout the twenty-five year tenure of this law, it will not hamstring
jurisdictions into a legal framework predicated on the persistence of outdated
assessments of racial polarization in the electorate.
A. Preferred Candidates of Choice
Arriving at a proper interpretation of the standard requires that we begin,
somewhat counterintuitively, at the end. If we can identify "preferred
candidates of choice, 1' 71 we can then begin to understand how a redistricting
plan might diminish the ability of citizens to elect them. This phrase in the new
section 5 mirrors the operative phrase in section 2 of the VRA, which ensures
that racial minorities will not have "less opportunity than other members of the
electorate ... to elect representatives of their choice.' 72 Despite the fact that
Congress enacted the amended section 2 twenty-five years ago, considerable
debate exists as to what "representatives of their choice" means. To put the
interpretative dilemma coarsely, the provision may mean minority candidate,
170. The findings in the bill itself warrant this special concern with racial polarization. Section
2(b)(3) of the bill identifies the congressional finding that "[t]he continued evidence of
racially polarized voting in each of the jurisdictions covered by the expiring provisions ...
demonstrates that racial and language minorities remain politically vulnerable, warranting
the continued protection of the Voting Rights Act of 1965." VRARA, Pub. L. No. lO9-246,
S 2(b)( 3), 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. (120 Stat.) 577, 577 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 note).
171. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c(b) (West Supp. 2007).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000). Section 2 follows on this phrase by explaining that "[t]he extent
to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this
section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to
their proportion in the population." Id.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Democratic candidate, or something more complicated that depends on an
analysis of the actual behavior of voters and their representatives.
In evaluating which of these alternatives makes sense, it is important to
understand that the identification of a "candidate of choice" is necessarily
endogenous to the way districts have been drawn and to which candidates have
emerged to compete. We never know who the minority's truly preferred
candidate is, given that we never have survey data asking all minority voters
who their ideal candidate would be. 73 Rather, what we have are election data
with respect to a constrained set of candidates and then heuristics (or perhaps
evidence) as to whether certain candidates are bona fide "candidates of choice"
of the minority community. The central questions involved in these inquiries
are whether merely garnering the votes of the minority community is enough
to characterize a candidate as "preferred," and if not, what other types of
evidence would be necessary.
Identifying the minority's candidate of choice serves two purposes. The
first is to assess which districts under the plan currently in effect (the
"benchmark" plan) are, in fact, "performing" for minority voters. If a minority
candidate of choice is able to win in a particular district, then reconfiguring
such a district to decrease the probability of such a candidate winning again
may be retrogressive. However, both "performing" districts and districts where
the minority candidate of choice does not win are relevant in a second way for
the retrogression inquiry. Data from all districts, let alone from a variety of
other types of elections, will be useful in assessing what minority voting
percentages are necessary for a minority group to elect its preferred candidates.
Only with these data can one develop an accurate assessment of how
population shifts between districts will affect the minority's ability to elect.
Identifying candidates of choice, however, is the first step in determining
which elections will be useful in making inferences about the likely effect of
new districts on voters.
1. Minority Candidate
Although sections 2 and 5 of the VRA are about voters, not candidates, the
race of the candidate is very often shorthand for identifying which voters may
have preferred that candidate. Of course, the minority community will often
prefer certain white candidates, just as whites will often prefer certain minority
173. Even if we did have such survey data, we could not get around the Arrow theorem-like
problems of identifying a single preference from a range of choices presented to a
nonmonolithic group of people. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
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candidates. The recent case dealing with the 2003 Texas re-redistricting is
illustrative on this point. In that case, appellants argued that a Hispanic
Republican was actually not the candidate of choice of the Hispanic
community in his district (given that he only won 8% of the Hispanic vote),
while a white Democrat was the candidate of choice of the African Americans
in a different district. '74 Indeed, the line attorneys at the DOJ agreed with that
assessment. 1
75
In the course of evaluating racial polarization in the electorate under section
2, it is commonplace for courts to assume that minority candidates are the
minority community's candidates of choice. 76  When expert witnesses
aggregate data across a range of elections over time, they rarely examine every
particular race to evaluate the authenticity of minority candidates as the
minority's preferred candidates or include white candidates as minority-
preferred candidates in their evaluations of the extent of racial polarization.
77
The same was often true with DOJ determinations of retrogression: minority
candidates were presumed to be the candidates of choice of the minority
community, unless there was a good reason not to make that assumption based
on which voters supported the candidate. 78
Whether minority candidates should be considered presumptive
"candidates of choice" of the minority community constituted a foundational,
but unanswered, question in the first Supreme Court case to interpret the
174. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2613, 2625 (2006)
(adjudicating challenges to Henry Bonilla and Martin Frost's districts); Sylvia Moreno,
Runoff in Tex. 23rd May Show Impact of 2oo6 Redistricting: Longtime GOP Rep. Bonilla in
Tight Race, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2006, at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyr/contentarricle/2oo6/a/1o/AR2oo6121OOlOO7.html (explaining that Bonilla
received only 8% of the Hispanic vote in his 2002 reelection).
175. DOJ Memo, supra note 16o, at 37-53.
176. See Katz et al., supra note 122, at 665-68 & nn.11o-12 (discussing the use of candidate race in
*section 2 litigation and assembling cases); Scott Yut, Comment, Using Candidate Race To
Define Minority-Preferred Candidates Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 1995 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 571, 583-86 (explaining that the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have rejected the use of
elections including only white candidates as proof, or lack thereof, of racial bloc voting).
177. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 77, 136-37 (1985) (describing the expert witness reports in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986)); Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1833, 1855-56 & n.1i1 (1992)
(citing cases where racially polarized voting was found based on candidates' race).
178. See Issacharoff, supra note 149, at 1725 (explaining that the expert witnesses for the United
States in Georgia v. Ashcroft assessed the probability of electing an African American
candidate).
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amended section 2 of the VRA. 179 Justice Brennan wrote for a plurality on this
point in Thornburg v. Gingles,18, while Justice White's concurrence specifically
disagreed.' 8 ' For Brennan, "it is the status of the candidate as the chosen
representative of a particular racial group, not the race of the candidate, that is
important. "1 82 Ignoring the race of the candidate, argued Justice White, would
violate congressional intent to allow certain types of interracial coalitions, as
when a coalition of white voters and a minority of black voters supports a black
candidate.'8 ' The lower courts have been divided since Gingles on the extent to
which candidate race ought to be a determining factor in the "candidate of
choice" inquiry.'84 Some find it determinative, 8 , while others follow Brennan's
approach and also consider elections that include minority candidates to be
"most probative" of racial polarization. 86
At least two senators in the reauthorization debate were bold enough to
make the former interpretation of the new retrogression standard explicit.
Senator Mitch McConnell from Kentucky and Senator John Cornyn from
Texas both emphasized the relevance of candidate race to determining
179. See Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itsef?. Social Science and Voting
Rights in the 2ooos, 8o N.C. L. REv. 1517, 1526 n.22 (2002) (discussing the various views of
the Justices in Gingles and concluding that minority versus white contests have usually
proven most probative in racial polarization hearings); Yut, supra note 176, at 576-89
(discussing the various views of the Justices and lower courts on whether race of the
candidate matters). Races between minority and white candidates are often seen as the most
probative for purposes of proving racial polarization. See, e.g., Clarke v. City of Cincinnati,
40 F.3d 807, 812 (6th Cit. 1994) (finding that "a candidate's race can be relevant to a § 2
inquiry"); Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1128 (3d Cir.
1993) ("As a general matter ... elections involving white candidates only are much less
probative of racially polarized voting than elections involving both black and white
candidates.").
1So. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
181. Id. at 82 (White, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 68 (plurality opinion).
183. Id. at 83 (White, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's concurrence specifically agreed with
Justice White's on this point. Id. at loi (O'Connor, J., concurring).
184. See Pildes, supra note 179; Yut, supra note 176.
185. See, e.g., Barnett v. Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 1998) ("It may be highly regrettable
that a candidate's race should matter to the electorate; but it does; and the cases interpreting
the Voting Rights Act do not allow the courts to ignore that preference."); Citizens for a
Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 502 (5th Cir. 1987).
186. See, e.g., NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002, 1015-17 (2d Cir. 1995); Nipper v.
Smith, 39 F. 3d 1494, 154o (lith Cit. 1994) (en banc) (plurality opinion); Jenkins v. Red Clay
Consol. Sch. Dist., 4 F.3d 1103, 1129 (3 d Cit. 1993); Sanchez v. Bond, 875 F.2d 1488, 1495(loth Cit. 1989).
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candidates of choice. As Senator McConnell put it, "[t]he term 'preferred
candidates of choice' has a clear meaning in the court's precedents: Minority
candidates elected by the minority community. ""' Senator Cornyn explained
that the new standard could not be applied "to require preservation of anything
other than districts that allow naturally occurring minority-group majorities to
elect minority candidates. ', 88 The race of the candidate, under this view, was
one way to limit the potential application of the standard to any candidate that
might receive minority votes. 89
2. Democratic Candidate
One of the reasons courts often assume minority candidates are minority-
preferred candidates is that otherwise the Voting Rights Act begins to look like
it is a Democratic candidate protection program.190 In general elections, racial
minorities tend to prefer Democrats. If the VRA requires the construction or
preservation of districts where minority-preferred candidates win, then one
might plausibly say that the VRA prevents the elimination of Democratic
leaning districts in any covered racially heterogeneous community. The DOJ
need only ask whether the candidate minorities voted for in the general election
under the benchmark plan is equally likely to win under the new plan. If not,
then minorities' ability to elect their preferred candidate is diminished.
This potential interpretation did not escape witnesses in the Senate
hearings nor, as the Committee Report makes clear, several Senate
Republicans. The testimony of Republican lawyer Michael Carvin provided
some of the only comments before the Senate Judiciary Committee concerning
the potential partisan bias of the new standard. ' 9 He warned that "Democrats
are almost always minorities' preferred candidates of choice and therefore, a
federal statute would prohibit diminishing the ability to elect Democratic
187. 152 CONG. REC. S798o (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
188. Id. (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
189. See also id. at S7979 (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("It is important to emphasize this language
does not protect just any district with a representative who gets elected with some minority
votes.").
19o. Cf. Baird v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 976 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The Voting
Rights Act does not guarantee that nominees of the Democratic Party will be elected, even if
black voters are likely to favor that party's candidates.").
191. See Section 5 Renewal Senate Hearing, supra note 32, at 135-43 (statement of Michael A.
Carvin, Partner, Jones Day).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
candidates, whether they are minority or non-minority."'92 Heeding that
warning, the Senate Report emphasized the point:
This legislation definitively is not intended to preserve or ensure the
successful election of candidates of any political party, even if that
party's candidates generally are supported by members of minority
groups. The Voting Rights Act was intended to enhance voting power,
not to serve as a one-way ratchet in favor of partisan interests."'
This fear expressed by the Republicans and the correlative need to limit the
scope of the retrogression standard to "naturally occurring majority-minority
districts" arose from concerns related to which kinds of districts the new
retrogression standard protects. Does it protect any district in which minorities
have some influence over an election, or is it somehow limited to districts in
which minorities currently control the outcome? A longer discussion of this
dilemma is provided below with respect to the definition of "ability to elect."
However, these questions are also relevant to defining "preferred candidate of
choice" because the process used to identify such candidates will determine the
minority percentages required in protected districts. In other words, if all one
needs to show is that minority votes were critical in electing a Democratic
candidate in a general election, then eliminating such a district would
presumably diminish minorities' ability to elect their preferred candidate. By
this standard, for example, John Kerry was African Americans' preferred
candidate of choice in the 2004 presidential election, given that the
overwhelming majority of African Americans voted for him instead of
President Bush.1 94
192. Id. at 138-39.
193. S. REP. No. 109-295, at 21 (2006); see also id. at 22-23 (additional views of Sen. Kyl) ("[I]n
jurisdictions in which the protected group of voters largely supports one party, a
requirement that those voters be placed in districts where their candidates and party will
prevail would introduce severe distortions into the redistricting process. In effect, that
jurisdiction would be required to create and retain as many districts as possible that would
reliably elect candidates of the party favored by the protected group of voters.").
194. One might temper the complete politicization of the standard by requiring that only
candidates who have also garnered minority support in a competitive primary can be
designated minority-preferred candidates of choice. Cf. League of United Latin Am. Citizens
v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2624-25 (2006) (arguing that Martin Frost was not a minority
candidate of choice under section 2 because he had never confronted a primary challenger).
This would avoid protection of the white Dixiecrat incumbent who garners minority votes
in the general election but receives none when confronting a minority challenger in the
primary. However, most minority incumbents from majority-minority districts also do not
face competitive primary challenges. If only candidates whose support from the minority
community has been proven in a competitive primary can earn candidate-of-choice status,
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As perverse and perhaps unintended as this interpretation might be, it
probably hews closer to the language of the statute than other alternatives.
Indeed, the new law's addition of the word "preferred" to the phrase
"candidate of choice" suggests that the candidate need not be the ideal or only
possible candidate of choice for the minority community. Instead, such
candidates need only be "preferred" to others that will run or have run against
them. To be clear, the interpretation is not that all Democratic districts are
protected. Rather, in any district where it can be shown that minority voters
tend to prefer and to elect candidates of one party (usually Democrats today,
but perhaps Republicans in the future), the state cannot redraw the district to
diminish their ability to elect such candidates. In some contexts, it will be
difficult to demonstrate which candidates minorities prefer. Exit polls in the
2004 presidential election, for example, showed that President Bush received
about 40% of the Hispanic vote, so it would be difficult to suggest that Senator
Kerry was Hispanics' generally preferred candidate of choice.195 Nevertheless,
in most elections, particularly at the district level, the rough alignment of
minorities behind one or the other party is easily recognized.
Should the implicit partisan bias of the new retrogression standard be
considered a problem? One might argue that if Republicans do not want
Democrats to earn protected candidate-of-choice status, then they should run
candidates who appeal to and win over minority voters. Until they do so, the
new section 5 protects against diminution of the reelection prospects of
Democratic candidates in jurisdictions with some percentage of minority
voters. Even if this constitutes the best plain language reading of the statute, it
is surely not the interpretation for which most Republicans voted.' 96
then few candidates would qualify. One might simply adopt a double standard for minority-
preferred candidate of choice that includes minority candidates and those white candidates
who have received the bulk of the minority vote when they have run against a minority
candidate in a primary. However, white candidates who have never faced a minority
challenger have not yet proven themselves to be the minority preferred candidates of choice.
David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran have proposed a definition of "candidates of choice"
that includes any candidate who wins the minority vote and is either a minority candidate or
a white candidate elected from a majority-minority district. David Epstein & Sharyn
O'Halloran, Measuring the Electoral or Policy Impact of Majority-Minority Voting Districts, 43
AM. J. POL. SCI. 367, 371 (1999).
195. See ROBERT SURO, RICHARD FRY & JEFFREY PASSEL, HISPANICS AND THE 2004 ELECTION:
POPULATION, ELECTORATE AND VOTERS, at ii (2005), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/48.pdf (showing that Hispanic support for President
George W. Bush in 2004 was close to 40% but also that there is considerable controversy
regarding the degree to which Hispanics supported Bush as opposed to Kerry).
196. See 152 CONG. REC. S79 87 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Sessions) ("We must
remember that we are reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act not creating a 'gerrymandering
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Moreover, Democrats' concerns about the current politicization of the Voting
Section of the DOJ are just as well taken as Republican fears of a DOJ under a
Democratic administration with a specific mandate to protect Democratic
candidates. If the new law is going to be successful (let alone upheld as
constitutional'97), it cannot be seen as a tool for the systematic furtherance of
certain partisan interests.
3. The DOJ's Most Recent Approach and the One Likely To Be Followed
As revealed most recently in the leaked preclearance memo concerning the
Texas re-redistricting, the DOJ has adopted an approach that does not
expressly rely on either the race or the partisanship of the candidate.'
98
Although the DOJ was interpreting the old section 5 under the now overruled
Georgia v. Ashcroft standard, its historic method of determining candidates of
choice is likely to rule the day once again under the new retrogression
standard. ' 99 That method, as far as it can be discerned, focused on whether
indicia apart from mere minority votes in the general and primary elections
suggested that minorities were satisfied that the candidate represented their
interests. In particular, the DOJ would consider opinions of minority
politicians and other elites as to whether the candidate was an authentically
preferred, as opposed to a reluctantly supported, candidate of choice of the
minority community.
Minority support in both the general and primary elections, as well as racial
polarization analysis, still represents the beginning for the DOJ approach to
identifying the minority's candidate of choice. Unless a candidate wins a
commanding majority of the minority vote in both the primary and general
elections, she cannot be considered the community's candidate of choice.
rights act.' The bipartisan support for this bill indicates that both Republicans and
Democrats do not expect or intend it to be interpreted to advantage one party or the
other.").
197. In his opinion in the Texas re-redistricting case, Justice Kennedy seemed to hint that section
2 of the Voting Rights Act should not be interpreted to protect the mere ability to aid in the
election of a Democratic candidate. "If § 2 were interpreted to protect this kind of influence,
it would unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every redistricting, raising serious
constitutional questions." League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594,
2625 (20o6) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (citing Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 491 (2003)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
19S. See DOJ Memo, supra note 16o, at 25-33.
19q. In the memo, the DOJ attorneys make explicit that they think Ashcroft does not alter the way
that they should determine ability-to-elect districts. It only forces them to consider the rise
and decline of influence districts in addition to the ability-to-elect districts. Id. at 26.
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However, since most districts are not competitive, merely winning the
minority vote does not necessarily indicate whether minorities prefer such
candidates per se or reluctantly support them because their ideal candidate is
not in the race. Otherwise, as explained above, almost all incumbent
Democrats would qualify as minority candidates of choice.
Therefore, to establish a candidate as the minority candidate of choice, the
DOJ must be able to point to some indication of the satisfaction of the minority
community with the candidate. The best piece of evidence, as mentioned
earlier, would be a poll of all minority voters asking who their ideal candidate
would be or what their preference is among realistic alternatives. In its stead,
the DOJ considers the comments of leaders of minority organizations, civic
activists, and politicians as to whether a candidate is one of choice, as opposed
to resignation.
In the Texas case, for example, these comments supported findings by the
DOJ that four white Democratic Congressmen (Martin Frost, Lloyd Doggett,
Gene Green, and perhaps Chris Bell) were minority candidates of choice, while
Hispanic Republican Henry Bonilla was not. Minority legislators, as well as
Frost himself, described Frost as the African Americans' candidate of choice
"because he is very responsive to the minority community.""' Similarly,
Representative Gene Green claimed to be the Hispanic candidate of choice
given his high ratings from the League of United Latin American Citizens
(LULAC)."' One local Hispanic official even described Green as "basically
Hispanic himself' given the fact that he "grew up in Hispanic neighborhoods,
200. Id. at j5; see also id. at 33-35 (discussing data indicating that Frost was the minority candidate
of choice); id. at 16 ("According to the 'scorecards' of minority groups, [Frost] has been
exceptionally responsive to the needs of the minority community."). The memo notes that
in the redrawn Twenty-Fourth District that captured the African American community that
formerly chose Frost, Republican State Representative Kenny Marchant would likely win in
the open seat (as he did). He was not considered a candidate of choice because he voted
against a hate crimes bill while in office, and subsequently received an "F" on the NAACP
scorecard for Texas state legislators. Id.
201. Id. at 22; see also id. at 40 (suggesting Chris Bell was also the minority candidate of choice in
his district based on his high score received from the Texas NAACP and the contentions of
minority elected officials as to his responsiveness to the minority community). The
candidate-of-choice status of Lloyd Doggett, whose district was seriously reconfigured by
the 2003 re-redistricting, presented an interesting twist on these other analyses. Id. at 52-55.
Based on favorable scores from LULAC and comments from minority elected officials as to
his responsiveness, he was seen as perhaps the candidate of choice of Hispanics in the Austin
area. Id. at 53 n.45. However, his new district combined the Austin Hispanic community
with one on the border with Mexico. The DOJ Memo therefore was equivocal as to whether
he would be the Hispanic candidate of choice in the new district: "we have heard anecdotal
testimony that while Doggett is the candidate of choice in Austin, he likely would not be the
candidate of choice 300 miles away in Hidalgo County." Id.
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went to a Hispanic high school, [and] knows the Hispanic culture. '2 ° 2 Henry
Bonilla, on the other hand, was not the Hispanic candidate of choice in his
district. Not only did he receive only 8% of the Hispanic vote in the previous
election, 20 3 but he was also regarded as "nonresponsive to the Hispanic
community" as evidenced by the 18% rating LULAC gave him on issues
concerning Hispanic voters. 4
As subjective and unsettling as these determinations of "preferred"
candidate status may appear, they reveal an inherent problem that plagues
assessments of candidates of choice. If one does not trust the revealed choices
of voters in elections because incumbency advantages and other factors
constrain which candidates emerge to compete, then one must turn to outside
indicators as to whether the candidate has the authentic support of the
minority community.20 Elites then must shoulder the burden of giving their
stamp of approval to the particular candidate, and the DOJ must pick which
elite opinions matter and which issue positions are in line with the minority
community.
As problematic as the DOJ's picking of which white candidates constitute
authentic candidates of choice of the minority community is in general, it
becomes even more so when it has obvious partisan effects. Most white
Democratic congressmen- even in the South-win an overwhelming majority
of the minority vote in both the primary and general elections, and most
206
receive high scores from the various civil rights organizations. Most come
2o2. Id. at 56. The memo also notes that Green's congressional Web site is one of the few offered
in Spanish.
203. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2613 (2006) (noting the
declining percentage of the Hispanic vote received by Bonila from 1996 to 2002); DOJ
Memo, supra note 16o, at 42 (same, and citing that regression analyses that estimate
Bonilla's share of the 2002 Hispanic vote at 6.6% and 3.5%).
204. DOJ Memo, supra note 16o, at 18.
205. In other words, for purposes of assessing which candidates the minority prefers, general
election data are "tainted" by the fact that voters do not have a wide range of choices
presented to them. That range is constrained because very few high-quality challengers have
the resources to take on an incumbent. As a result, the anemic set of choices appearing on
the ballot and available to voters does not provide an accurate filter for what voters' true
candidate preferences would be if a greater variety of candidates could compete effectively.
Given the lack of high-quality challengers, let alone minority candidates in general,
additional information besides election results is necessary to distinguish which Democratic
candidates would still have received minority votes if a broader range of choices had been
presented.
206. This point is not as uniformly true when it comes to state legislators and local officials, and
was not true concerning southern Democratic congressmen until the realignment of
southern politics in the 198os and 199os.
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from districts that are majority white. Very few face a minority challenger or,
for that matter, any quality challenger that poses a real threat in the primary or
general election. Therefore, in today's political world, the DOJ method appears
very similar to the Democratic candidate model described before, and will
become increasingly so as the parties in government become more
homogeneous. The more that white Democrats behave and vote like minority
Democrats, the more white Democratic candidates will appear as minority
candidates of choice by these criteria.2 7
4. Candidates Uniquely Preferred by Minorities
The conceptual difficulties of defining minority-preferred candidates of
choice in a way that does not assume that candidates of a certain race or party
qualify for that label are almost impossible to overcome. However, I should not
exaggerate the differences between this inquiry and the one the DOJ engaged
in under the previous section 5, or the one the courts engage in under the
current section 2. For the most part, courts have explicitly or implicitly adopted
candidate race as the proper indicator under section 2. Although racial bloc
voting analysis has always been part of the evaluation of a preclearance
submission, the DOJ also has relied on candidate race or moved closer to the
more partisan definition, as the Texas preclearance memo suggests. I fully
expect that when experts make predictions about the probabilities of minority-
preferred candidates getting elected in the abstract, they will continue to rely
on the race of the candidate as an indicator of minority preference under the
207. In fairness to the DOJ approach, one might note that the responsiveness of elected officials
to the minority community was one of the Senate Factors underlying the amended section 2.
See Katz et al., supra note 122, at 722-24 (assembling cases that have assessed the Senate
factor of "significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials"). In interpreting
section 2, the Third Circuit adopted a reading of "candidates of choice" similar to that
emerging from the Texas preclearance memo. In Jenkins v. Red Clay Consolidated School
District Board of Education, 4 F.3d 1103 ( 3d Cir. 1993), the court explained that section 2
required "a detailed, practical evaluation of the extent to which any particular white
candidate was, as a realistic matter, the minority voters' representative of choice." Id. at 1129.
The factors a court should consider would include: "the extent to which the minority
community can be said to have sponsored the candidate," id., "the level of minority
involvement in initially advancing the particular candidate and in conducting or financing
that candidate's campaign," id., "the attention which the candidate gave to the particular
needs and interests of the minority community, including the extent to which the candidate
campaigned in predominately minority areas or addressed predominately minority crowds
and interests," id., "the rates at which black voters turned out when a minority candidate
sought office as compared to elections involving only white candidates," id., and "the extent
to which minority candidates have run for office and the ease or difficulty with which a
minority candidate can qualify to run for office," id.
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new section 5. At the same time, when concentrating on particular incumbents
from particular districts, assumptions about the "representativeness" and
responsiveness of each party's nominees also seem impossible to avoid.
Perhaps one could avoid both of these pitfalls by focusing on whether
candidates are uniquely preferred by the minority community. A preferred
candidate of choice, under this view, would be one supported by the
overwhelming majority of minority voters, but not supported by the
overwhelming majority of white voters. This would require, as is typical in
litigation under section 2, demonstration of racial bloc voting patterns: in
particular, proof that minorities and whites vote cohesively and differently.o 8
When evaluating changes in redistricting plans, then, courts or the DOJ would
ask whether they lead to a smaller probability that the types of candidates
preferred by minority voters and disfavored by whites will be elected. More
importantly, in a context where minority candidate preferences are not distinct
from those of whites, the retrogression standard would not apply. In other
words, a candidate could only earn the status "minority-preferred candidate of
choice" if it could be shown that she had been chosen (or would be chosen) by
a supermajority of minority voters in an election where her opponent was the
candidate of choice for a supermajority of white voters.
What constitutes a supermajority under these terms is an important devil
in the details, of course. On the one hand, as in section 2 litigation, one cannot
require that 100% of the minority population and ioo% of whites vote for
different candidates in order to prove racial bloc voting. At the other extreme,
evenly divided white and minority communities would be evidence against
racial bloc voting. The answer must lie somewhere in the middle. For the most
part, evidence of minority political cohesion is not terribly difficult to identify,
especially when African Americans are the minority in question."29 Qite often
one will be able to identify cohesion at a level of 90% or more.2"' Whatever
minimum level of cohesion the court requires to demonstrate minority bloc
voting, however, should be the same as that required with respect to white bloc
voting. If minority political cohesion in designating someone as a candidate of
choice requires a demonstration that three-quarters of the minority vote goes
to a particular candidate, the same level of cohesion ought to be required with
respect to whites. Under section 2, plaintiffs did not need to show that whites
2o8. Cf Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986).
209. See Bernard Grofman, A Primer on Racial Bloc Voting Analysis, in THE REAL Y2K PROBLEM:
CENSUS 2000 DATA AND REDISTRICTING TECHNOLOGY 43 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2000).
ao. Indeed, the Michigan study found that in over half of the elections in covered jurisdictions
that were part of a section 2 lawsuit, white bloc voting existed at 90% or more. See Katz,
supra note 77, at 220.
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voted cohesively, only that they voted in sufficiently large numbers that would
ordinarily defeat the minority-preferred candidate.2"'
I would endorse this as a starting point for the retrogression analysis
because it has several advantages. It limits the potential number of "protected"
districts and avoids either the racialization or politicization of determinations
of candidates of choice, drawbacks of the previous two approaches. This
approach falls in line with Justice Kennedy's recent admonition to avoid
interpretations of the Voting Rights Act that "unnecessarily infuse race into
virtually every redistricting, raising serious constitutional questions."1" It also
seems to get at the real problem that motivates the Ashcroft fix: the interaction
between redistricting changes and voting behavior that lessens the probability
that minorities will elect their preferred candidates.
However, this approach also has several disadvantages. This interpretation
tortures the language of the new section 5, given that the actual words of the
statute focus on a group's preferred candidate of choice irrespective of whether
whites may also prefer such a candidate. Simply because a racial minority
prefers a candidate does not imply that whites disfavor him or her. Similarly, a
showing that African American New Yorkers prefer the Yankees to the Mets
does not imply that whites do not share the same preference-that is, the
Yankees can be both the black- and white-preferred team of choice. The same
could be said for politicians: Barack Obama may have been the preferred
candidate of choice for all racial groups in his 2004 Senate bid, for example.
To get around this textualist critique one would need to emphasize that the
words of the statute do not actually read "minority-preferred candidate of
choice." Rather, they refer to diminishing the ability of any citizens "on
account of race or color" or language-minority status to elect their preferred
candidates of choice. In other words, the statute does not merely focus on
which groups prefer which candidates, but instead on whether the diminution
in the group's ability to elect its preferred candidates was on account of race.
That different focus would imply an inquiry into the cause of the diminution
(e.g., the fact that whites prefer different candidates) alongside an assessment
of which candidates were preferred by which racial groups.
211. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 5o-51.
212. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2625 (2006) (opinion of
Kennedy, J.) (citing Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). The
Court rejected a section 2 claim made with respect to Texas's twenty-fourth congressional
district, a district that was minority black but in which blacks constituted a majority of the
Democratic primary and allegedly elected Martin Frost (a white Democrat) as their
candidate of choice.
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Perhaps the more serious critique of this approach is that it does not
present a complete solution. It only captures half of what is needed for the
retrogression analysis. It deals with particular candidates in particular districts,
but does not help with the larger analysis of how drops in racial percentages, in
general, may affect minorities' ability to elect their preferred candidates,
whether or not such candidates have yet to run in the district. This
interpretation may get us out of the simple syllogisms of minority or
Democratic candidate equals minority candidate of choice by forcing a
demonstration that a particular candidate received most of the minority vote
while his opponent received the white vote. However, it does not tell us in the
abstract what type of candidate the statute protects from a reduced chance of
being elected. If a minority-preferred candidate has never run in a given area,
for example, this approach would not tell us whether changing a given district
in the area reduces the ability of minorities to elect their preferred candidates." 3
In order to measure diminution in the ability to elect, one needs to be able to
predict how a change in racial percentages will affect unknown candidates as
well as known ones.
With these caveats, and the larger one that the statutory provision should
be treated as a whole rather than as a collection of isolated phrases, attention to
racial bloc voting should form the core of the new retrogression inquiry,
regardless of how we define candidate of choice. Even if courts resign
themselves to one of the earlier definitions, as I suspect they will, evaluating
the effect of new districts on minorities' ability to elect either minority
candidates or authentically representative (Democratic) candidates will require
a sensitive analysis of different voting patterns among whites and minorities.
Although conceptually very important in deciding what the Voting Rights Act
is about, disagreement as to how to identify a minority-preferred candidate
should not affect how we then assess whether new district boundaries diminish
the chances that such a person will be elected.
213. Moreover, in a safe district for a minority incumbent, it might appear that the unchallenged
incumbent receives a majority of both the minority and white vote. Therefore, because of
the lack of a quality challenger to siphon off the white votes the minority candidate
ordinarily might not receive, it would appear that the minority candidate is not uniquely
preferred by the minority community. Therefore, one might argue that such a district could
be reconfigured without a risk of diminishing the ability of minorities to elect a candidate
they prefer and whites disfavor. The way around this problem is to recognize that more than
one election must be incorporated into a determination of preferred candidates and that the
inquiry ought to focus on whether the district elects candidates minorities tend to favor and
whites tend to disfavor (irrespective of the current incumbent).
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5. The Role of Incumbency in Determining Candidate of Choice
As mentioned above, the candidate-of-choice inquiry is relevant both for
assessing which districts currently "perform" for the minority community as
well as what racial percentage is necessary for a district, in general, to elect the
minority's preferred candidate. One variable that confounds each of these
inquiries is the role of incumbency in the evaluation of retrogression (as well as
dilution under section 2).214 The weight a retrogression inquiry ought to
attribute to incumbency in a determination of district performance represents a
very important, but unresolved, issue in voting rights jurisprudence. The
question, in a nutshell, is the following: when determining whether a district
will elect the minority candidate of choice, should one assume that the existing
incumbent will be running for reelection? Whether a district is an open seat,
one represented by a minority incumbent, or one represented by a white
incumbent, will greatly affect the minority percentage necessary for minorities
to elect their preferred candidate.21
In other words, do the words "preferred candidate of choice" refer to an
identifiable individual or simply a candidate in the abstract? For a minority
challenger to defeat a white incumbent, for example, districts historically
needed to be redrawn to become a substantial majority-minority district (close
to 6o%, for example), whereas minority incumbents have been able to win
reelection in districts that are minority-minority. In open seats, the required
percentage may lie somewhere in between. Therefore, a change in district lines
that draws a minority incumbent out of her district, for example, 'might be
retrogressive, if, as a result, another minority candidate of choice cannot win
from that district.
As is clear from the Texas preclearance memo, DOJ lawyers routinely ask
whether a given incumbent is a minority candidate of choice and how the
redrawing of districts will affect that specific candidate's reelection prospects.6
There is much to commend this approach, which includes an evaluation of the
effect of a plan not only on a given incumbent, but also on any particular
candidate likely to run from a redrawn district. The likelihood that a specific
candidate of choice will be contending for the upcoming election will be very
relevant to evaluating whether the racial percentages in the newly redrawn
214. See Katz et al., supra note 122, at 673 (assembling section 2 cases that deal with the
confounding variable of incumbency).
215. Cf. Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley & David Lubin, Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A
Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1383, 1407-09 (2001).
216. See supra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
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district affect the minority community's ability to elect him. If a new
redistricting plan ensures the reelection of that specific candidate, then under
this view the plan does not retrogress.
On the other hand, limiting the retrogression inquiry to the facts as they
exist at the time of the redistricting runs the risk of creating districts that
perform for a given candidate, but not for minority-preferred candidates in
general. Keeping in mind that a redistricting plan is likely to govern elections
for ten years, assessments of district performance based on a given set of
candidates in the first election under the plan may become outdated by the end
of the decade.217 More importantly, those who draw districts with particular
minority incumbents in mind are gambling on the likelihood that the
incumbent will continue to run (and win) from that district. If one's
predictions are off the mark, then a district that may not have diminished
minorities' ability to elect their preferred candidate when it was drawn may
nevertheless have that effect shortly thereafter when the candidate field
changes.
B. The Ability To Elect
By adding the words "ability ... to elect" to the new section 5, Congress
attempted to overrule Georgia v. Ashcroft and return the retrogression inquiry to
what it was under the Beer v. United States standard.218 The problem is that
there is disagreement about what the standard under Beer was and how one
determines minorities' "ability to elect." '19 The central point of debate is
whether it implies certain rigid numerical thresholds (such as districts that are
217. The same might be said with respect to likely population changes. Just as one might want to
know which candidates will be running from the district, one might also want to know how
the district's racial percentages might evolve over the course of a decade. In other words, if a
district's minority population is likely to increase or decrease substantially over the course of
a decade-through migration patterns, for instance-one might want to factor in the
district's likely evolution when one is drawing the lines.
218. See H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 94 (2006) (pointing out that the new law partly overrules
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003)); 152 CONG. REc. H5143, 5163 (daily ed. July 13,
2006) (demonstrating Representatives Sensenbrenner and Watt's agreement that the new
retrogression standard reenacts Beer into law).
219. See David J. Becker, Saving Section 5: Reflections on Georgia v. Ashcroft and Its Impact on the
Reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act, in VOTING RIGHTS AcT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006:
PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER, supra note 77, at 223, 227-30
(pointing to disagreement among academic commentators and the DOJ as to what the Beer
standard meant in practice).
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over 50% minority) or focuses on a more nuanced analysis of voting behavior
and success of candidates of choice.
1. No More Tradeoffs for Influence Districts
Georgia v. Ashcroft relaxed the constraint of section 5 by allowing covered
jurisdictions to trade off "ability to elect" districts with so-called influence
districts.22 In practice (and on the facts of the case itself), this would usually
mean allowing drops in the percentages in majority-minority districts so as to
increase the probability of electing (usually white) Democrats across a greater
number of districts. By overruling Ashcroft, the new section 5, at a minimum,
seeks to prevent tradeoffs between influence districts and ability-to-elect
districts.
What constitutes an influence district is not readily apparent,2 ' and as the
Court recognized in Ashcroft, the universe of districts is not filled merely with
influence and ability-to-elect districts.2 We know that an influence district is
one in which minorities usually cannot elect their candidate of choice, but will
have influence over who would likely win. Often this would mean that in a
district otherwise evenly split between white Democrats and white
Republicans, for example, minority Democrats could tip the balance in favor of
the Democrat in the general election. That Democrat would not be the
minority's first choice if they had been more numerous in the district and their
ideal candidate had run. However, the minority vote would be able to sway the
outcome of the election between the Republican and Democratic nominees so
as to avoid the election of minority voters' least preferred candidate.
Other definitions of influence districts abound, however. One might read
the Court's treatment of such districts as encompassing any district in which
minorities constitute some specified percentage: any district under 5o% or
between 25% and 5o% minority.2 3 Moreover, the influence that minorities
might exert may not be electoral influence per se, but influence over the
decisions and policy positions of their representatives.2 4 In other words, an
22o. See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 480-83.
221. See Pildes, supra note 179, at 1539 ("The concept of influence is nebulous and difficult to
quantify.").
222. Both the Senate and House reports emphasize the amorphousness of the definition of
influence districts, which undermined the potential guarantee of section 5. See H.R. REP.
No. 109-478, at 68-72 (2006); S. REP. No. 109-295, at 18-21 (20o6).
223. See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 486-87.
224. See id. at 482.
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influence district might be a district in which minorities constitute a share of
the district significant enough such that they will not be ignored by the
eventually elected representative, whether or not minorities voted for that
person. Others have attempted to refine further the definition of influence
districts and different definitions will be more or less concrete. 22s For the
supporters of the new section 5, however, Ashcroft opened the possibility that
under the cloak of influence districts, jurisdictions would create districts in
which minorities had no influence at all.2"6 Regardless of whether one agrees
with that take on Ashcroft, it is clear that the bill's ability-to-elect language
attempts to remove the possibility of a tradeoff with influence districts.2 7
That being said, Ashcroft recognizes at least one other category of districts,
so-called coalitional districts. A coalitional district is one in which minorities
constitute under 50% of the district, but with likely white crossover voting,
they will be able to elect their preferred candidate. For example, a district that
is 40% African American, 20% liberal white Democrat, and 40% Republican
would be a coalitional district if the liberal whites ordinarily vote for the
candidate preferred by the African American community. It might also be fair
to say that a prerequisite for a coalitional district is that minorities constitute a
majority of the Democratic primary, such that their preferred candidate will
almost certainly be on the general election ballot and therefore electable with a
combination of minority support and white crossover voting.28
Whether coalitional districts that fit this definition qualify as ability-to-
elect districts under the new section 5 was a source of debate among members
of Congress. Recognizing the potential partisan effect of protecting such
districts, the Senate Report goes out of its way to group coalitional districts
225. See Need fo- Section 5 Pre-Clearance Senate Hearing, supra note 32, at 198-207 (statement of
Richard Pildes); Bernard Grofman, Operationalizing the Section 5 Retrogression Standard of the
Voting Rights Act in the Light of Georgia v. Ashcroft: Social Science Perspectives on Minority
Influence, Opportunity and Control, 5 ELECTION L.J. 250, 265-72 (2006); Pamela S. Karlan,
Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L.J. 21, 32-35 (2004).
226. See H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 70 (2006) (expressing concern over "testimony indicating
that '[m]inority influence is nothing more than a guise for diluting minority voting
strength."').
227. In addition to the retrogression standard discussed at length above, see supra note 167 and
accompanying text, the law, in extraordinary and emphatic language, goes on to clarify in
section 5(d): "The purpose of [the new retrogression standard] is to protect the ability of
such citizens to elect their preferred candidates of choice." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c(d) (West
Supp. 2007).
228. See generally Grofman et al., supra note 215, at 1407-09 (2001) (detailing the importance of
primary elections for estimating the minority percentage necessary for electing minority
candidates of choice).
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with influence districts and emphasizes that neither is protected by the new
retrogression standard. 9 The House Report takes the exact opposite point of
view: "Voting changes that leave a minority group less able to elect a preferred
candidate of choice, either directly or when coalesced with other voters, cannot be
precleared under Section 5. 23° From this sentence one might reasonably
conclude both that a tradeoff of majority-minority districts with coalitional
districts would not violate the new section 5, and that a reduction in the
number of coalitional districts would in fact be retrogressive. In other words,
ability-to-elect districts include both coalitional districts and "safe" minority
"control" districts, in which minorities need not rely on white crossover voters
to elect their preferred candidates.
2. "Naturally Occurring" Majority-Minority Districts?
Seeking to cabin the potential politicization of the retrogression standard
and its widespread application to any district with a nonnegligible minority
community, the Senate Report makes clear that the new retrogression standard
merely protects "naturally occurring majority-minority districts" '231 from
229. See S. REP. No. lO9-295, at 21 (2006).
23o. H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 71 (2006) (emphasis added).
231. S. REP. No. 109-295, at 21 (2006). I am reliably informed by Morgan Kousser that the
phrase "naturally occurring majority-minority district" was probably coined by Katharine
Inglis Butler in a 1995 Rutgers Law Journal article. See Katherine Inglis Butler, Affirmative
Racial Gerrymandering: Fair Representation for Minorities or a Dangerous Recognition of Group
Rights?, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 595, 618 (1995) ("[I]f there were more 'naturally occurring'
majority-minority districts, legislators would not have resorted to drawing bizarre ones.").
In the hearings on the new VRA, the phrase appears to have been first used by Republican
attorney Anne Lewis in her testimony in the House. See Voting Rights Act: The Judicial
Evolution of the Retrogression Standard: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, logth Cong. 30-37 (2006) (statement of Anne Lewis, Partner,
Strickland Brockington Lewis LLP). The phrase is not present in any Supreme Court
precedent in the redistricting or voting rights case law. One can see hints of the idea in two
lower court cases, although neither of these cases was seriously discussed in the
reauthorization debate. See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 776 (9th Cir.
199o) ("[T]he district court objected to the placement of the Hispanic majority district in a
section controlled by a powerful incumbent, rather than in the one section that had a
naturally occurring open seat, an open seat that was 'in the heart of the Hispanic core.'");
Smith v. Beasley, 946 F. Supp. 1174, 1201 (D.S.C. 1996) ("These two new majority-minority
districts are Districts 29 and 37. Furthermore, Couick testified that one additional black-
majority Senate district could be drawn from naturally occurring concentrations of black
population; however, at trial, he could not specifically identify such an area."). Several
senators reemphasized this interpretation of the standard with speeches from the floor
during reauthorization. See 152 CONG. REc. S7 9 7 9 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of
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elimination. Of course, there is no such thing as a "naturally occurring"
district; all districts are artificial in that a linedrawer imposes them onto a
population. By "naturally occurring" the Report means those districts "that
would be created if legitimate, neutral principles of drawing district
boundaries, such as attention to county and municipal borders, were combined
with the existence of a large and compact minority population to draw a
district in which racial minorities form a majority."23
There is nothing in the words "ability to elect" that should limit it to
"naturally occurring" districts of whatever racial percentages. 33 Rather, the
choice of words reveals both political impulses and constitutional constraints.
The political impulse arises from the fact that freezing in place districts that
capture large and compact minority populations benefits Republicans.
Democratic gerrymanders often will try to disperse minority populations
efficiently so as not to "waste" reliable Democratic votes. In many jurisdictions
(Atlanta, for example), drawing districts within county lines will lead to the
creation of several supermajority-minority districts. The only way to push the
minority percentages in the districts down closer to 50% and prevent "packing"
is often to join heavy concentrations of minorities in the core of the city with
whites in the suburbs. 34
Political impulses aside, the drive to limit the new retrogression standard to
naturally occurring majority-minority districts is in line with the series of cases
that question the constitutionality of drawing districts predominantly based on
race.2 3 The Shaw v. Reno line of cases236 applied strict scrutiny to districts that
subordinated traditional districting principles (such as compactness and
respect for political subdivision lines) to race. Following Shaw, the Court
struck down on equal protection grounds an array of majority-minority
districts, which were bizarrely shaped and created pursuant to what the Court
determined was the DOJ's overzealous enforcement of section 5. These districts
Sen. Kyl) (emphasizing the limiting definition of naturally occurring majority-minority
districts); id. at S798o (statement of Sen. Cornyn) (same); id. at S7979 (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (same); id. at 8oio (statement of Sen. Specter) (same).
232. S. RPE. No. 109-295, at 21 (2006).
233. Cf. 152 CONG. REC. S8oLo (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
234. In some cases, a supermajority-minority district can be avoided by joining urban minorities
with urban whites, making the district appear less "unnatural." However, these districts also
turn out to be inefficient for Democrats given that the whites who live next to large minority
populations in cities often are overwhelmingly Democrats.
235. See 152 CONG. REc. S7979 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
236. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
117:174 2007
THE PROMISE AND PITFALLS OF THE NEW VOTING RIGHTS ACT
were allegedly "unnatural," because they cobbled together far-flung African
American or Hispanic communities in order to create a majority-minority
district. The new focus on naturally occurring majority-minority districts,
then, is, in part, an admonition to the DOJ to avoid forcing jurisdictions to
create or maintain Shaw-violative districts.237
The emphasis on "naturally occurring" majority-minority districts is also in
line with the most recent Supreme Court decision interpreting section 2 of the
237. One of the ironies of reading Shaw and its progeny to require an interpretation of section s
limited to naturally occurring districts is that compliance with section 5 has been the one
thing that would allow a jurisdiction to create an "unnatural" majority-minority district.
Shaw requires the application of strict scrutiny to districts drawn predominantly on the basis
of race, but later cases assume that compliance with the VRA is a compelling state interest
justifying the intentional creation of such districts. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 982; Hunt, 517 U.S.
at 9o9-1o. In other words, if the VRA commands the creation of a district so as to avoid
retrogression, the state can surmount the usually fatal strict scrutiny by drawing a district
narrowly tailored to avoid a violation of section 5. Even Justice Scalia most recently agreed
with this constitutional interpretation, holding that a district drawn on the basis of race as
part of the Texas re-redistricting passed strict scrutiny because it was drawn to avoid
retrogression. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2666-67
(2006) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Nathaniel Persily, Strict in Theory,
Loopy in Fact, 1O5 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 43 (20o6), http://students.law
.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/volhos/persily.pdf.
With the newly enacted section 5 the questions emerge whether compliance with a
now-changed VRA continues to represent a compelling state interest or whether courts
should interpret the new section 5 to discourage (or bar) the creation of districts
predominantly drawn on the basis of race. Justice Scalia's opinion in the Texas case suggests
the intentional creation of an ability-to-elect district (which was not even required under
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 431 (2003)) can overcome strict scrutiny if drawn to avoid
retrogression. Moreover, nothing in the cases describing compliance with section 5 as a
compelling state interest indicates that the particular wording of the retrogression standard
is what made compliance with it so compelling. Rather, allowing compliance with the VRA
to serve as a compelling state interest was driven by a desire to avoid forcing jurisdictions
into the impossible position of choosing whether to violate the Constitution or the Voting
Rights Act.
The fact that Georgia v. Ashcroft relaxed the retrogression inquiry should not be relevant
to whether forcing jurisdictions to retain ability-to-elect districts constitutes a compelling
state interest. The Court treated compliance with section 5 as a compelling state interest
before Ashcroft undercut the Beer standard, Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), and
the decision to retain an equal number of ability-to-elect districts even after Ashcroft was
seen (at least by Justice Scalia in League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2667-
68 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting)) as constituting a compelling state interest.
The return of the retrogression inquiry to the Beer standard should not alter the compelling
nature of compliance with section 5. Nevertheless, if a jurisdiction goes too far-as did those
disciplined by the Shaw cases- by creating districts that are not necessitated by the VRA or
are not narrowly tailored to avoid a violation of the ability-to-elect standard, then such
districts will fail strict scrutiny.
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Voting Rights Act. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in League of United
Latin American Citizens v. Perry struck down the Texas congressional districting
plan under section 2 because it had broken up a culturally cohesive Hispanic
community in South Texas and attempted to compensate with a different
majority-Hispanic district capturing two geographically distant and culturally
distinct communities.23 8 Although not using the "naturally occurring"
language, the opinion considers the state to have broken up a compact, almost
organic, Hispanic community with "an efficacious political identity." '39 At the
same time, the plan tried to compensate for the elimination of that "natural"
Hispanic district by creating an unnatural district that artificially stitched two
different Hispanic communities together. The majority Hispanic district
broken up by the redistricting plan appears to be what the Senate Report
would deem "naturally occurring" and therefore protected from diminution
under the new retrogression standard. On the other hand, the standard would
not require the maintenance or creation of something like the "offset district,"
which stretched from Austin to the Mexico border and which would appear to
be an unnaturally occurring majority-minority district.
3. The Importance of Racial Bloc Voting to the Ability To Elect
More important than its introduction of "naturalism" to the debate over the
Voting Rights Act is the Senate Report's emphasis on majority-minority
districts as the singular type of district protected under the ability-to-elect
standard. By this interpretation, for the next twenty-five years a covered
jurisdiction can never reduce the minority percentages in a district that is
slightly over so% minority. The 50% threshold is magical under this view
because once a minority community passes it, at least in theory it can exercise
control over the election if all of its members vote cohesively. Indeed, a similar
238. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2613-2o (majority opinion); id. at 2619
("We emphasize it is the enormous geographical distance separating the Austin and
Mexican-border communities, coupled with the disparate needs and interests of these
populations - not either factor alone - that renders District 25 noncompact for § 2 purposes.
The mathematical possibility of a racial bloc does not make a district compact."); see also
Daniel R. Ortiz, Cultural Compactness, 1O5 MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 48 (20o6),
http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/volio5/ortiz.pdf (describing the theory
undergirding Justice Kennedy's opinion).
239. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2619 ("[T]he Latino population of District
23 was split apart particularly because it was becoming so cohesive. The Latinos in District
23 had found an efficacious political identity, while this would be an entirely new and
difficult undertaking for the Latinos in District 25, given their geographic and other
differences.").
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impulse underlies the first of the famed Gingles factors operationalizing section
2 of the VRA."4 If a minority community is large and compact enough to
constitute a majority in a single-member district, then it may have a claim that
the failure to draw a district around that community constitutes impermissible
vote dilution."' The best arguments for this interpretation are that it would
ensure some symmetry between sections 2 and 5, and it would constrain the
potential range of districts that would be subject to the retrogression inquiry.
However, as argued below, the minority share of a district's population, by
itself, without considering the voting behavior of minorities and whites, is
inherently incomplete as a metric of the minority community's ability to elect
its preferred candidates.
The division between the Republican and Democratic senators on this
point became clear in the floor debate over reauthorization. Senators Cornyn
and Kyl presaged the position of the Committee Report, as well that to be
expressed in their "additional views."" 2 Senators McConnell and Hatch
concurred that the Act only protected "naturally occurring majority-minority
districts."' 43 This approach differed considerably from that of Senator Leahy:
"The amendment to Section 5 does not, however, freeze into place the current
minority voter percentages in any given district.... [T]here is no 'magic
number' that every district must maintain to satisfy the 'ability to elect'
standard.... "'
As an initial matter, the moniker "majority-minority" is not as concrete as it
first sounds. The central question will often be: majority of what? That is,
what should the denominator be for which minorities constitute over So% of
the given district? Should it be population, voting age population (VAP),
citizen voting age population (CVAP), eligible voting population, registered
voters, or likely voters? One cannot simply say the new section 5 protects
240. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).
241. See id. at 5o n.16.
242. See 152 CONG. RaC. S7 9 7 9 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasizing
the limiting definition of naturally occurring majority-minority districts); id. at S79 78-7 9
(statement of Sen. Cornyn) (same); id. at 8olo (statement of Sen. Specter) (same).
243. 152 CONG. REc. S7979 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see id. at S7 979 -
8o (statement of Sen. McConnell).
244. Id. at S8oo5 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see also id. at S8oio
(statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("Contrary to the suggestions of Senator Cornyn and Senator
Kyl on the floor, while the standard rejects the notion that 'ability-to-elect' districts can be
traded for 'influence' districts, it also recognizes that minority voters may be able to elect
candidates of their choice with reliable crossover support and, thus, does not mandate the
creation and maintenance of majority-minority districts in all circumstances. The test is fact-
specific, and turns on the particular circumstances of each case.").
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majority-minority districts from elimination without refining what is meant by
such districts. This is not a dilemma unique to the new section 5; it presented
itself with the old section 5 45 and section 2.46 However, by focusing on the
ability to elect, the new retrogression standard pushes to the forefront the
question of which statistics will be most reliable in predicting how a given
district will "perform" for the minority community.4 7
It would also seem beyond empirical dispute that population statistics by
themselves are insufficient to estimate the minority community's ability to elect
its preferred candidates. In some cases, constituting 51% of a district's
population will not be enough for minorities to elect their preferred candidates
(however we define them), and in others it will be much more than necessary.
To assess accurately a group's ability to elect its preferred candidates one must
know not only the size, likely turnout, and voting preferences of the minority
community, but also the political preferences and voting behavior of whites.748
If no whites will cross over to vote for minority-preferred candidates, then a
larger minority presence in the district will be necessary for minorities to elect
their preferred candidate.
If we recognize, as we must, that minorities often have the ability to elect
their preferred candidates in districts in which they constitute a minority of the
245. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 472, 473 n.1, 487-89 (2003) (urging that the
retrogression inquiry look at total population, voting age population, and registered voter
population).
246. See Katz et al., supra note 122, at 661 nn.8o-82. (assembling cases that take divergent
approaches as to the use of total population, voting age population, and citizen voting age
population in section 2 cases).
247. Cf. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 480 ("'No single statistic provides courts with a shortcut to
determine whether' a voting change retrogresses from the benchmark." (quoting Johnson v.
De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020-21 (1994))). The difference between the various statistics
could be substantial depending on the region of the country and the particular minority
concerned. It would be difficult to argue, for example, that a district with a 51% Hispanic
total population is likely to elect a Hispanic candidate of choice if half of the Hispanics in the
district are not citizens and voting in the district is racially polarized. Similarly, if legal
barriers to voting, such as felon disenfranchisement, fall heavily on a particular minority
community, then mere population figures might misrepresent the relative ability of the
minorities to elect their preferred candidates. The point of this discussion is not to argue for
any particular denominator; indeed, the "right" statistic to determine the "ability to elect"
will depend on context. Rather, this discussion highlights that a simple rule of "over So%
minority" does not reveal whether the minority can actually elect its candidates of choice.
248. See 152 CONG. REC. S8oo (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("[T]here is
no 'magic number' that every district must maintain to satisfy the 'ability to elect' standard;
the percentages will vary depending on such variables as the extent of racially polarized
voting and white crossover voting, registration rates, citizenship variables, and the degree of
voter turnout.").
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district's population, then the new retrogression standard protects (or at least
requires consideration of) so-called coalitional districts. In other words,
districts in which the votes of whites ensure that the minority community can
elect its preferred candidate are also protected under the new standard. More
importantly, alongside population changes, the extent and effect of racial bloc
voting in a benchmark and proposed districting plan becomes the central
inquiry to determine retrogression. Assuming the world can be divided into
ability-to-elect and non-ability-to-elect districts (an assumption complicated
by the next Section), then the elimination of a coalitional district that
"performs" for the minority community would be retrogressive (all else equal).
Therefore, the section 5 inquiry will force the DOJ to evaluate whether the
shuffling of both the minority and white populations into new districts will
lead to the election of fewer minority-preferred candidates. In the paradigmatic
inquiry, the DOJ would assess whether population changes between districts
coupled with the likely voting behavior of both whites and minorities will
decrease the likelihood of minorities electing their preferred candidates. This
will mean, perhaps controversially, that even maintaining the same minority
percentages from the benchmark plan in proposed districts may nevertheless
be retrogressive. If a plan replaces loyal white crossover voters in a coalitional
district with white voters unwilling to vote for the minority's preferred
candidate, then the plan may be retrogressive. Such a change, despite the
maintenance of identical racial percentages, will have the effect of diminishing
the ability of minority voters in that district to elect their preferred candidate.
Equally controversial, on the other hand, is the corollary: in areas where
there is no racial polarization of the electorate, no change in district lines will
be retrogressive. Not only would it be difficult under such circumstances to
identify a candidate distinctly preferred by the minority community, but when
candidate preferences do not correlate with race, minorities' ability to elect
would not be affected by the decision of which population to include in their
district. Breaking up a 6o%-black district into two 3o%-black districts, for
example, would not be retrogressive if the white and black communities are
identical in their candidate preferences.
4. "Ability To Elect" as a Continuous or Dichotomous Variable?
Given that no magic number exists to identify an ability-to-elect district, a
more functional approach must guide the retrogression inquiry. Until this
point, the discussion of the ability-to-elect standard has assumed that districts
can be categorized as either ability-to-elect or no-ability-to-elect districts. In
reality, the ability to elect preferred candidates, like the ability to play the
violin, is a matter of degree, not a difference in kind. Some districts have a
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near-loo% ability to elect (so-called performing or safe districts); in others,
minorities' ability to elect their preferred candidates might be closer to 5o% or
next to nothing. Districts can be arrayed along a continuum according to their
ability to perform. Diminishing a district's ability to elect does not necessarily
mean reducing it from a safe district to a hopeless district (i.e., a move from a
guaranteed district to one where minorities have no chance of electing their
preferred candidates). It could mean reducing a safe district to a competitive
district, or a competitive district to a hopeless district or any downward shifts
along that very wide spectrum. According to this interpretation, any district
with some ability to elect a minority-preferred candidate must be part of the
retrogression inquiry and is protected from diminution.
The Senate Judiciary Committee was well aware of these potential
implications. Michael Carvin's testimony before the Committee warned:
[T]he bill prevents "diminishing the ability" to elect candidates of
choice, so it clearly reaches and protects districts where minorities did
not have a demonstrable pre-existing power to elect the candidate of
choice under the old plan. If minorities had a 40% chance of electing
their candidate in the old influence district and the new plan reduces
that potential to 20%, then the ability to elect has been "diminished" by
the plan. 49
Because of such warnings and a recognition that this interpretation follows
from the plain meaning of the words in the statute, the Senate Committee
Report insisted that the only changes that might constitute retrogressive
diminution would be the elimination of a naturally occurring majority-
minority district. Senator Kyl's additional views drove the point home: "[T]he
VRARA's changes to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act ensure that the Act will
protect the creation and retention of naturally occurring districts with a clear
majority of minority voters-and nothing more.""' By contrast, Senator Leahy
argued that "[t]he 'ability to elect' standard does not lock in districts that meet
any particular threshold. Determinations about whether a district provides the
minority community the ability to elect must be made on a case-by-case
basis."25'
Although reading "ability to elect" as a continuous variable would broaden
the retrogression inquiry to include any district where minorities have some
249. Section 5 Renewal Senate Hearing, supra note 32, at 140-41 (statement of Michael A. Carvin,
Partner, Jones Day).
250. See S. REP. No. 109-295, at 22 (2006) (additional views of Sen. Kyl).
251. 152 CONG. REC. S8oo5 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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chance of electing their preferred candidates, it is not completely clear who
would benefit. The interpretation could be contrary to Democratic interests in
that it would be retrogressive to replace a district with a loo% probability of
electing the minority's preferred candidate with one with only a 9o%
probability, without compensating for the drop elsewhere in the plan.
Democratic attempts to "unpack" inefficient districts would then violate section
5, and even heavily concentrated minority districts must be preserved. On the
other hand, Republicans might be concerned that even reductions among
districts at the lower end of the spectrum would constitute retrogression. If a
25% minority district has a io% chance of electing the minority-preferred
candidate, for example, section 5 would prevent decreasing the minority
percentages in a way that might reduce that candidate's chances of election
from slim to none.
Having raised the specter that the DOJ's retrogression inquiry may expand
to virtually any district with some presence of minority voters with a nonzero
probability of electing their preferred candidates, that hyperbole should be
hedged by the fact that the range of districts in covered jurisdictions today
where minorities have some intermediate ability to elect their preferred
candidates is narrow. Moving from an 8o% minority district to a 65% minority
district will almost never have any effect on the minority community's ability
to elect its preferred candidates. Similarly, decreasing a 25% minority district
will rarely change that district's inability to elect the minority-preferred
candidate. At least when we define the candidate of choice as the minority
candidate (a controversial but oft-made decision, as argued earlier), the curve
relating minority population shares to election of minority candidates in
covered jurisdictions is S-shaped." 2 In other words, precisely due to racial
polarization in the electorate, districts with small minority populations have
little ability to elect minority candidates, and districts over 6o% minority are
virtually identical in their guaranteed election of the minority candidate. That
being said, the new retrogression standard will be in place for twenty-five
years, and over that period, as racial polarization declines, we should begin to
see greater diversity at both ends of the spectrum.
252. See Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 130, at 65. By S-shaped I mean that districts with
minority voting age percentages below 30% have little chance of electing minority-preferred
candidates, while those over 60% have an almost guaranteed chance of electing a minority-
preferred candidate.
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C. Diminishing
Even if we can arrive at some agreement as to who a candidate of choice is
and when minorities have an ability to elect him or her, we still need to be able
to assess how such ability can be diminished. The two principal questions here
are whether the statute allows for tradeoffs between control and coalition
districts and whether it protects against overconcentration of minority voters as
well as underconcentration.
In the background of both of these questions is the uncertainty as to
whether the Court's decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft has a constitutional
component to it, in addition to existing as an interpretation of the extant
Voting Rights Act. In particular, is the flexibility that the Court read into
section 5 constitutionally required, or did it merely constitute an assessment of
statutory meaning? If such flexibility is constitutionally required either by the
Equal Protection Clause or the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendment, then the overruling of Georgia v. Ashcroft with a new
section 5 that grants less latitude to covered jurisdictions makes the statute
vulnerable." 3 However, a more flexible interpretation of section 5 necessarily
expands the scope of the retrogression inquiry to include a greater number and
variety of districts. Doing so might run afoul of Justice Kennedy's admonition
that an interpretation that "unnecessarily infuse[s] race into virtually every
redistricting, rais[es] serious constitutional questions." 4
253. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 490-91 (2003) ("[T]he Voting Rights Act, as properly
interpreted, should encourage the transition to a society where race no longer matters: a
society where integration and color-blindness are not just qualities to be proud of, but are
simple facts of life." (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993))).
254. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2625 (opinion of Kennedy, J.)
(citing Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Justice Kennedy's cryptic
Ashcroft concurrence, which may constitute the best tea leaves for predicting how the Court
might handle the new standard, similarly warned against interpretations of the VRA that
excessively injected race into districting plans. He viewed the facts in that case in the
following way:
JR]ace was a predominant factor in drawing the lines of Georgia's State Senate
redistricting map.... Race cannot be the predominant factor in redistricting
under our decision in Miller v. Johnson. Yet considerations of race that would
doom a redistricting plan under the Fourteenth Amendment or § 2 seem to be
what save it under § 5.
There is a fundamental flaw, I should think, in any scheme in which the
Department of Justice is permitted or directed to encourage or ratify a course of
unconstitutional conduct in order to find compliance with a statutory directive.
This serious issue has not been raised here ....
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1. Ability To Elect per District or Across Districts?
In overruling Georgia v. Ashcroft, the new section 5 squarely rejects the
notion that ability-to-elect districts can be eliminated (or traded off with
influence districts) as part of an overall plan to increase minority influence in
the legislature as a whole. In Ashcroft itself, the state argued and the Court
agreed that the extent of minority influence on the policymaking process (e.g.,
because of leadership positions held by minority-preferred representatives or
the fact that minorities would be in the majority party controlling the
legislature) was a factor to be considered in favor of a tradeoff between ability-
to-elect and influence districts."' It is clear from the findings in the law, the
House and Senate reports, and all supporting legislative materials, that the new
law rejects that factor as relevant to the new retrogression standard. The
argument that minorities will be better off if Democrats control the legislature,
for example, is now off the table when it comes to the retrogression inquiry.2,
6
However, preventing reductions in the number of ability-to-elect districts
to increase the number of influence districts or to capture control of the
legislature is not the same as banning tradeoffs among ability-to-elect districts.
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
One can read Justice Kennedy's opinions in Georgia v. Ashcroft and League of United
Latin American Citizens as recognizing that the fewer districts to which the Voting Rights Act
applies, the more likely it is to be constitutional. In other words, if every district with some
minority population potentially raises an issue under section 5, then Congress has forced
states to be excessively race-conscious in a way prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.
This might lead one to conclude that applying a pragmatic threshold, such as majority-
minority districts, would be a constitutionally safer construction of the new VRA, because it
limits section 5's scope.
On the other hand, one can read Kennedy as wanting to preserve state flexibility to
comply with section 5. According to this view, Ashcroft's allowance of tradeoffs among
different types of districts is an effort to reduce the race consciousness inherent in some
more rigid standard. If so, then the problem is not so much the number of districts to which
the VRA would apply, but rather the likelihood that it will lead to the construction of
districts unconstitutional under Shaw. Given that the Court has only struck down majority-
minority districts under Shaw, an interpretation of the VRA that does not box jurisdictions
into creating or maintaining such districts would be on safer constitutional ground.
25S. See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 482-83.
256. I do not discuss this important change in depth here because no reasonable interpretation of
the new standard could get around the repudiation of that particular aspect of the Ashcroft
decision. By avoiding a discussion of that change, I do not mean to understate its political
and theoretical importance. The effect of this move is to hinder the ability of Democrats to
gerrymander for partisan advantage while avoiding retrogression. It also takes the side of
advocates for descriptive representation in their debate with advocates for substantive
representation.
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If the "ability to elect" describes a spectrum, then the question becomes
whether the decrease in ability to elect in one district can be compensated with
an increase in the ability to elect in other districts. For example, if in one
district minorities have a loo% ability to elect their preferred candidate and in
another they have a so% ability to elect, can the state replace those two districts
with two that have an 8o% probability of electing minority-preferred
candidates? Does such a redistricting plan, which increases the aggregated
probability that minority-preferred candidates will be elected, retrogress?
It is fairly clear that those who drafted the new section 5 were concerned
about the possibility of certain types of tradeoffs. The problem they had with
Georgia v. Ashcroft was that it allowed risking safe seats for more marginal ones
for the good of the Democratic Party. Of course, the Ashcroft Court described
this as a tradeoff between safe seats and influence districts.5 7 For those who
worry about any decrease in minority descriptive representation, however,
trading a few safe seats for a larger number of "probable to elect" districts
would invite the same criticism as would such tradeoffs to increase the number
of influence districts. Moreover, given that the greatest fear arising from
Ashcroft was that a jurisdiction might call something an influence district as a
pretext for minority vote dilution, civil rights lawyers would justifiably have
the same fear when a jurisdiction says it is moving from a few high-
probability-to-elect districts to a greater number of low-probability-to-elect
districts. After all, the interpretation proposed here would allow the trading of
one loo% ability-to-elect district for ten io% ability-to-elect districts. Concerns
with those kinds of tradeoffs are very similar to the ones that motivated the
Ashcroft fix in the first place.
If the Court views the Ashcroft fix as treading close to the constitutional
line, this interpretation offers a way to avoid constitutional difficulty."' The
constitutional challenge to the Ashcroft fix will be based on both the Equal
Protection Clause and Congress's power to enforce the guarantees of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.5 9 An interpretation of the new section
257. See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 482-83.
258. See Michael J. Pitts, Georgia v. Ashcroft: It's the End of Section 5 as We Know It (and I Feel
Fine), 32 PEPP. L. REV. 265 (2005) (explaining why Ashcrof helps make section S
constitutional).
259. See Katz, supra note 73 (suggesting that the Ashcroft fix makes the Court more likely to strike
down the new section 5 on federalism grounds). I should be clear that I consider both this
aspect of the new section 5 and the statute as a whole to be constitutional. Five members of
the current Court, however, will give greater scrutiny to a federal mandate of certain types
of districts than I would. I tend to agree with Pamela Karlan's spin on what the proper
analysis of the constitutionality of section 5 ought to be, although I am confident the Court
will disagree with this position. See Karlan, supra note 73.
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5 that seems to freeze majority-minority districts for twenty-five years raises
concerns about racial predominance akin to those expressed in the Shaw line of
cases. The decision to mandate a particular view of descriptive representation
in a subset of states also raises concerns that Congress has exceeded its
remedial and prophylactic authority under section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment or section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
An interpretation of the Ashcroft fix that allows for tradeoffs like those I
have described avoids some of these potential pitfalls. The greater the
flexibility given to states to comply with section 5, the less likely the Court will
be to view it as either excessively race-based or beyond Congress's power to
protect civil rights. One should not understate the significance of the fact that
this statute will be in place for twenty-five years. The level of racial polarization
in covered jurisdictions and the legitimate fears people have about vote dilution
in today's political climate might not be present toward the end of the statute's
lifespan; at least that should be the aspiration underlying the interpretation of
the reauthorized VRA.
2. Diminution Through Overconcentration and Underconcentration of
Minority Voters
One reason to adopt a long-view interpretation of section 5 is that the
prevalent strategies for diminishing minority voting power will change over
time. In particular, if racial polarization in the electorate declines, the
overconcentration of minorities in districts will prove to be a more threatening
strategy of diminution than will the underconcentration of minorities. In other
words, as smaller and smaller minority percentages are necessary in a district
for minorities to elect their preferred candidates, the corralling of minorities
into overconcentrated districts ("naturally occurring" or not) will prove to be a
greater threat than splitting minorities into too many districts. The ability of
minorities to elect their preferred candidates can be diminished by "packing,"
as well as "cracking."26 '
The fact that minorities can be made worse off by packing them into too
few districts, as well as cracking them among too many, is not disputed by
anyone. The disagreement occurs as to whether and when the new standard
prevents such overconcentration. If one takes the position that only majority-
minority districts are protected under the new standard, then combinations of
260. See 152 CONG. REC. S8005 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (arguing that
the new section 5 bars "all types of retrogressive changes, whether they come from the
dispersion of a minority community among too many districts (cracking) or the
overconcentration of minorities among too few (packing)").
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districts that do not affect the number of majority-minority districts in a plan
would not give rise to retrogression. For example, combining one 6o%
minority district with another 30% minority district into a single 90% minority
district would be allowed.26' Through such reconcentrations, however, it is
possible to reduce the number of districts in which minorities can elect their
preferred candidates or might have any reasonable chance of doing so.
Perhaps it is so obvious that it need not be stated, but allowing
retrogression by way of "packing" but not "cracking" would prevent the most
frequent types of Democratic partisan gerrymanders while leaving the most
frequent strategy of Republican gerrymanders untouched. Democrats, as in the
Georgia legislative plan upheld in Ashcroft, often try to spread reliable minority
voters as thinly as possible to maximize the number of Democratic seats.
Republican linedrawers do the opposite, concentrating minorities into as few
districts as possible so that the remaining districts are more likely to elect
Republicans. Given that Republicans are likely to control the next redistricting
process in many Southern states, however, it is worth recognizing the types of
redistricting changes on which the DOJ will most likely pass judgment in the
immediate future.
3. The Art and Science of Measuring Diminution in the Ability To Elect
Until now, the analysis of the retrogression standard has assumed that one
can point to a district and assign it a percent probability that it will elect the
minority-preferred candidate. In litigation surrounding sections 2 and 5, as well
as preclearance submissions to the DOJ, social scientists attempt to do just
that. Based on voting behavior of different racial groups in past elections in the
jurisdiction, experts can develop predictions about the likelihood that a given
district with a given percentage of minority voters will elect the minority's
preferred candidate. Different experts will develop different estimates and the
decision maker (the DOJ or the courts) will evaluate which is most reliable.
Often the debate will concern which past elections will be most probative of
future performance and how much importance factors such as incumbency and
candidate quality should have for predicting the future voting behavior in the
district. We should expect the same process to unfold with the new
retrogression standard.
However, we should all take with a grain of salt the precision with which
experts can assign probabilities to redrawn districts based on past election
261. To be sure, in such instances the redistricting changes might run afoul of the discriminatory
purpose prong of the new retrogression inquiry or the constraints of section 2 of the VRA.
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behavior. Experts might be able to differentiate easily between lOO% and 0%
ability-to-elect districts, but no expert can assess with scientific accuracy the
difference between a district with a 30% probability of electing a minority-
preferred candidate and one with a 40% probability., 62 Especially if the new
section 5 will force experts to evaluate probabilities for districts with even small
minority populations, the art of describing minority voting power ought to
temper the science of measuring retrogression.
By this I mean that in evaluating potentially retrogressive changes in
redistricting plans, the DOJ and the courts ought to keep the purposes of the
new section 5 in mind. In particular, jurisdictions that attempt to break up
some safe minority districts into a greater number of districts with lower
probabilities of electing minority-preferred candidates ought to be very
confident that they have, in fact, maintained or increased the chances that a
certain number of minority-preferred candidates will win. Over time, as racial
polarization declines, it should become easier for jurisdictions to overcome that
presumption, and in some covered jurisdictions we may have reached that
point already. It is quite clear, however, that those who wrote and supported
this new law would not want aberrant expert reports about relative
probabilities of minority-preferred candidates' election to provide a blank
check to jurisdictions to dilute minority votes.
Recognizing the proper weight of this burden of proof ought not to be seen
as a cop-out from the nuanced analysis advocated in this Part. On the contrary,
the need for a skeptical eye in evaluating claims of nonretrogressive tradeoffs
among minority districts arises simply from a realistic appraisal of our
capabilities or lack thereof in predicting election outcomes. The best
interpretation of the new section 5 is one that will preserve some flexibility to
account for political changes in the covered jurisdictions for the next twenty-
five years. The interpretation still should be seen as an authentic constraint on
retrogressive gerrymandering and one that is more severe than the constraint
that existed under the law as previously interpreted by the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
Given the various objections critics have lodged against the reauthorization
process and its eventual product, one might think the new VRA will be
262. This expertise is not limited to the minority voting rights context. Experts can easily point
to most districts and declare them safe or unsafe for one or another party, for example.
Before the nominees are chosen and the campaigns begin, however, no one can say with
confidence that there is specifically a 40% chance that the Republicans will win a given seat,
for example.
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doomed when the Court considers its constitutionality. I am less sure than
others about the fate of the new VRA. The VRA remains the gold standard for
exercises of congressional power to enforce civil rights. More importantly, a
decision striking down the VRA would be the most dramatic exercise of
judicial review over a federal law since the Lochner era. As much hay as law
professors have made over the series of federalism decisions emanating from
the Rehnquist Court, the laws considered in those cases (e.g., the Gun Free
School Zones Act,263 the Violence Against Women Act,264 the application of the
Americans with Disabilities Act26s or Age Discrimination in Employment ACt266
to damages actions against states) constitute the periphery of federal power.
The VRA, on the other hand, lies squarely in the core. Were the Court to strike
down the new VRA as exceeding congressional power (even based on the
eminently reasonable arguments as to why Congress has overstepped its
bounds) it would be exercising its muscle of judicial review to an
unprecedented extent. Perhaps this is why even Justice Scalia has suggested
that he would allow stare decisis to apply to congressional actions under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment that concern race 67 and has recognized
compliance with the VRA as a compelling state interest.2
68
Unlike the other statutes that form the recent federalism jurisprudence, the
constitutionality of which the Court had not previously assessed, the Court has
specifically upheld previous incarnations of the VRA. A court seeking to strike
down the VRA will need to explain why a previously constitutional statute is
now unconstitutional. Moreover, in passing the VRA Congress was both
protecting a fundamental right and preventing discrimination against a suspect
class- taken together these two conditions would suggest congressional power
is exceptionally expansive. It is also potentially acting under both section 2 of
263. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2000).
264. 42 U.S.C. § 13,981 (2000).
265. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111-12,117 (2000).
266. 29 U.S.C. 621-634 (2000).
267. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 560 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A lot of water has
gone under the bridge since Morgan, and many important and well-accepted measures, such
as the Voting Rights Act, assume the validity of Morgan and South Carolina." (citing
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966))); id. at 564 ("Thus, principally for reasons of stare decisis, I shall henceforth apply
the permissive McCulloch standard to congressional measures designed to remedy racial
discrimination by the States." (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819))).
268. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2666-67 (20o6) (Scalia,
J., concurring and dissenting); Persily, supra note 237.
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the Fifteenth Amendment and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.269 The
unique position of the VRA precedent and the constitutional sources for
congressional action make a challenge to the VRA a harder case to predict than
if the Court were considering a statute with less potential for tectonic shifts in
the relationship between the branches and between states and the federal
government.
With that said, all involved realize that the new VRA walks close to the
constitutional line the Court has drawn in the Boerne line of cases.2 70 More
likely than striking the statute down outright and suffering the political fallout,
the Court might interpret the law to avoid constitutional difficulty.
Recognizing the importance of racial polarization in the electorate to the new
section 5 could serve both to bolster its constitutionality and to give its central
provision a meaning that would retain relevance throughout its twenty-five
year tenure. The best way to distinguish the covered from the noncovered
jurisdictions is the relative unwillingness of whites in the covered jurisdictions
to vote for minority-preferred candidates of choice. At the same time, as that
unwillingness subsides and the notion of a minority-preferred candidate
becomes difficult to discern, the new retrogression standard ought to
accommodate and celebrate these developments.
In particular, section 5 should be read as preventing alterations in districts
that reduce the aggregated probability across districts that minorities will elect
the candidates who they prefer and who whites generally disfavor. This
interpretation is true to the purpose of preserving minorities' ability to elect
their preferred candidates, while building in some flexibility as the law achieves
its goal of reducing racial polarization in the electorate. Unlike others, this
interpretation does not have clear partisan winners and losers, nor does it
calcify present minority percentages in some or all districts. As such, it might
be just the kind of limiting interpretation a court would search for to uphold
this constitutionally contentious exercise of congressional power to enforce the
guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
269. Let alone the Elections Clause. See Karlan, supra note 73.
270. See cases cited supra notes 71-72.
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